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1 PREFACE 
The Economic and Social Committee (ESC) has voted by a huge majority for the abolition of tax 
frontiers. This verdict on the Commission's new tax package proposed in 1989 as a follow-up to the 
1987 proposals
1 Is In keeping with a long series of ESC positions on tax matters adopted over the 
last twelve years2• 
In its most recent Opinions the ESC has made some technical comments and concrete suggestions 
to the Community institutions for bringing about a more adequate tax system in the interests of 
business, public administration and the general public. 
1.  On 22 January 1990 the Council decided to ask the ESC for an Opinion on the Commission Commu-
nication  to  the  Council  entitled  "New  Commission  Approach  to  Excise-Duty  Rates" 
(COM(89)  551  final) as well as on three proposals for directives to align excise duty rates on 
(i)  cigarettes and other manufactured tobacco, (ii)  mineral oils and (iii)  alcoholic beverages and 
the alcohol contained in other products. 
2.  At the Council's request the ESC also issued Opinions on four proposals for directives concerning 
the structure of duties as well as the general arrangements for and the holding and movement of 
products liable for excise duty; these give a commondefinition of taxable products and describe 
the final scheme to be applied to these products from 1 January 1993. 
3.  Also in the field of taxation the Council asked the ESC on 25  February 1989 for an Opinion on a 
Proposal for a Directive on a Common System of Withholding Tax on Interest Income and on a 
Proposal concerning Mutual Assistance by the Competent Authorities of the Member States in 
the field of Direct Taxation and Value Added Tax (COM(89)  60  final/3). 
The ESC's Position on Excise Duty Rates 
4.  The ESC first of all stresses that the aim of proposals for harmonization must be to: 
- abo  I  ish tax frontiers; 
- avoid significant distortions of competition; and 
- prevent fraud and tax evasion. 
The ESC then points out that the problem of excise duties has to be seen in the larger context of 
indirect taxation and, more generally, the taxation system as a whole. 
The ESC reaffirms the views expressed in its 1988 Opinions on excise duties whilst accepting that 
adjustments will have to be made because of the present  situation. It cannot approve the 
Commission Communication (COM(89)  551  final) in its present form. To be able to make an 
accurate and thorough assessment of the excise duty proposals, the ESC would also need to be 
familiar with the proposals on the collection of duties, the movement of goods, controls, bonded 
warehouse regulations and the marking of individual products. 
The ESC expressed its support for these 1987 proposals in a series of eight Opinions on the harmonization of indirect taxes Issued In 
July 1988. 
2  Cf. among others: 
-Information Report of 12  July 1988 on Tax Harmonization, Rapporteur: Mr FREDERSDORF (CES 846178); 
-Opinion of 27 November 1985 on "Completing the Internal Market"-White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, 
Rapporteur: Mr POETON -Co-Rapporteur: Mr ROUZIER (OJ No. C  344 of 31  December 1985); 
- Opinion of  22  May 1986 on a Proposal for Imposing a Standstill on VAT and Excise Duties, Rapporteur: Mr  DELLA CROCE (CES  500186); 
-Opinion of 27  November 1986 on Financial Integration In the Community, Rapporteur: Mr DRAGO (CES  970/86); 
-Opinion of 28 January 1987 on Turnover Taxes Applicable to Smaller Businesses, Rapporteur; Mr  BROICHER (CES 95187). 
3 The ESC considers that minimum and maximum rates need to be fixed for all excise duty rates 
confined within mandatory bands. Since significant changes inexisting rates might cause problems 
for some Member States, convergence towards the new bands should be allowed to continue after 
the introduction of the Single European Market. The ESC feels that the minimum and target rates 
proposed by the Commission are too high. The bands proposed in the Opinion should be consoli-
dated at a lower level, especially in the case of certain products. The ESC also stresses that excise 
duties should be a tax on consumption and not on the factors of production. 
Specific Proposals on Excise Duties 
Cigarettes and Tobacco (COM(89) 525 final 
5.  The ESC deplores the absence of a coherent overall policy on tobacco. While some intervention 
instruments seek to help producers, the effect of taxation policy has been to reduce consumption 
of EEC  tobacco without  providing  equivalent  disincentives to consume  imported  tobacco. 
Moreover, the concern for consumer health, which has led the Commission to propose considerably 
higher target rates than in 1987, has been too unfocused and does not form part of a general health 
policy. The Commission proposals penalize cheaper products and are unacceptable because they 
would adversely affect Community tobacco-growing. In short, the ESC's overall opinion of the 
Commission's proposal is unfavourable. 
Mineral Oils (COM(89) 526 final) 
6.  The ESC repeats the calls in its 1988 Opinion for: an alignment of excise duties at the lowest 
possible level, bearing in mind Member States' budgetary requirements; the abolition of all excise 
duties on heavy fuel oils used purely for production purposes, LPG and heating oil; the harmoni-
zation of tax advantages already granted to certain economic sectors or activities; and parallel 
treatment for road tax and other charges relating to the use of vehicles. To sum up, the aims of 
the Commission proposal are approved but not the means suggested for achieving them. 
Alcoholic Beverages (COM(89) 527 final) 
7.  As well as recalling its 1988 Opinion the ESC proposes the rapid phasing-out of excise duty on 
wine and beer, a cut in the very high rate of duty on potable alcohol and the abolition of excise 
duty on solid foods containing alcohol. 
Structure and the Movement of Products Subject to Excise Duty 
(COM(90)  431, 432, 433 and 434  final) 
8.  The ESC welcomes the Commission's proposals for harmonizing the structures of specific excise 
duties. However, harmonization measures in this field cannot counteract distortions of competition 
caused by excise duty disparities. The fact that the Commission confines itself to a small number 
of excise duties is welcomed. Checks, which are the responsibility of the Member States, should 
be effective, but their sole purpose should be to prevent tax fraud and smuggling. 
4 
The ESC suggests a number of amendments to the draft directive on the general arrangements 
for products subject to excise duty and on the holding and movement of such products; these 
amendments are intended to clarify the Commission text, particularly with regard to the customs 
territory, the chargeable event, the acquisition of products subject to excise duty, exceptions in 
the mail-order trade, limitation of  cases where a guarantee is required, identification of products, 
the setting-up of a numbered register, and differentiation between identification markings and tax 
markings. Subject to these amendments, the ESC regards the Commission proposal as appropriate 
with a view to  the removal of customs checks in intra-Community trade in products subject to  excise 
duty from 1992. Specific remarks are made concerning individual products (alcohol, tobacco, 
mineral oils). Withholding Tax on Interest Income (COM(89) 60 final/3) 
9.  The Commission's proposal to introduce a Community-wide withholding tax on interest income 
meets with the ESC's approval, subject to certain comments. The proposal to extend mutual 
assistance is welcomed. 
As part of the liberalization of capital movements this measure seeks to remove or reduce the risks 
of distortion, tax avoidance and tax evasion linked to the diversity of national systems for taxing 
savings and for monitoring the application of these systems. The ESC considers that a withholding 
tax is a justifiable form of  taxation for various reasons, including that of fairness, as most Member 
States already operate a similar system. However, it will still be possible to invest capital in non-
EEC countries where there is no such tax, which means that the Community will have to negotiate 
agreements with the main non-EEC countries. The ESC thinks 10°/o could be a reference rate for 
a withholding tax and proposes that interests from savings accounts should be free from tax. 
Jean PARDON 
Chairman of the Section for Economic, 
Financial and Monetary Questions 
5 OPINION 
of the Economic and Social Committee 
on the 
Proposal from the Commission to the Council on 
transitional arrangements for taxation with a view 
to establishment of the internal market 
{COM{90) 182 final • SYN 27 4) 
7 Procedure 
On 17 July 1990 the Council decided to consult the Economic and Social Committee, under Article 
198 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, on the 
Proposal for transitional arrangements for taxation with a view to establishment 
of the internal market 
(COM(90)  182 final- SYN 274). 
The Section for Economic, Financial and Monetary Questions, which was responsible for preparing 
the Committee's work on the subject, drew up its Opinion on 11  September 1990 in the light of the 
Report by Mr DELLA CROCE. 
At its 279th Plenary Session (meeting of 19 September 1990) the Economic and Social Committee 
adopted the following Opinion by a large majority, with 6 dissenting votes and 6 abstentions: 
*  *  * 
1.  Introduction 
The present proposal represents a change of stance by the Commission following the negative 
reactions of the Council and Member State Governments to its previous proposals. 
In 1987, the Commission had submitted a proposal for a common VAT mechanism with a view to 
completion of the internal market and the removal of tax frontiers 
1
• 
The aim was to harmonize VAT by reducing the number of rates to two and fixing them within bands 
of upper and lower limits. The proposal also introduced the principle of "taxation in the country of 
origin", whereby intra-Community sales  and  purchases of goods would  be  afforded the same 
treatment as transactions within Member States. 
The Economic and Social Committee adopted an Opinion on the Commission proposal (CES 740188), 
which should be mentioned here(
2>. 
The Council subsequently said it was unable to endorse the Commission's approach, partly because 
a number of Member States had in the meantime expressed clear opposition to the proposals. 
On 14 June 1989 the Commission therefore sent a communication(
3
> to the Council and the European 
Parliament, proposing that a transitional phase be established at the earliest opportunity, lasting 
until 31  December 1992, so that the necessary adjustments could be made. At the same time, it 
proposed a minimum standard VAT rate instead of a band, special arrangements for certain trans-
actions and a clearing system based on statistics. 
The Economic and Social Committee Opinion was highly critical of the communication(
4>. 
On 9 October 1989, the Council said it did not believe a general agreement could be reached before 
1 January 1993. It did, however, approve- for a limited period- the principle of charging VAT in the 
country of destination with differential treatment for certain classes of transaction. 
On 13 November 1989 the Council stressed that taxes should be levied in the country of origin, and 
considered this a medium-term objective. It did, however recognize that VAT on transactions between 
taxable persons in different Member States would have to be charged in the country of destination, 
according to the rates and conditions obtaining in that country, in order for VAT arrangements to 
operate properly. 
(1)  COM(87) 322 final- OJ C 252 of 22.9.1987. 
(2)  CES 740/88 ·OJ C 237 of 12.9.1988, page 19. 
(3)  COM(89) 260 final 
(4)  CES 1368/89 
9 The Council and the Commission also agreed to carry out a comprehensive study by 31  December 
1996 at the latest with a view to deciding how and when to introduce the definitive, uniform VAT system 
after the transitional period. 
2.  The Commission proposal 
Consequently, whilst reiterating that tax frontiers are to be dismantled once and for all and that the 
ultimate objective is to levy taxes in the country of origin, the Commission is now making a number 
of changes to its previous proposals and is proposing to introduce transitional arrangements. 
Under the proposals, the following transactions would continue to be taxed at the rates and under 
the conditions obtaining in the Member State of destination: 
sales to institutional non-taxable persons and to fully exempt taxable persons; 
mail-order sales to private individuals where the seller's annual turnover from mail-order sales 
in other Member States exceeds ECU 1 million; 
sales of new passenger vehicles (subject to the conditions laid down in Article 2(6)). 
During a transitional period from 1 January 1993 to 31  December 1996 (at the latest), goods traded 
between one Member State and another on the basis of transactions other than those listed in the 
paragraph above will be taxed in the country of destination. 
In other words, sales of goods destined for another EC Member State will be exempt of VAT, whereas 
acquisitions will be liable to VAT (payable by the person making the acquisition) in the country of 
destination. 
VAT will be paid when regular returns are made, rather than when goods are actually imported. 
Tax on purchases by institutional persons not liable to VAT and by fully exempt persons will be payable 
in the country of origin provided the total volume, in other words the total amount of goods acquired 
in a Member State other than that of destination, net of VAT, does not exceed ECU 35,000 (ECU 70,000 
from 1 January 1995) during the calendar year. 
Intra-Community transactions by smaller firms will benefit from the exemption arrangements that 
already apply to domestic transactions in some Member States. 
There will be no restrictions on acquisitions by private individuals where tax is paid to the country 
where the acquisition takes place. Mail-order purchases by private individuals will be taxed in the 
country of destination. 
According to the Commission, the new system will reduce the administrative burden and costs to 
be borne by firms, as intra-Community transactions will be subject to the same checks as domestic 
transactions, based on normal trade documents,,.particularly invoices. 
The only additional obligation will be the breakdown of the amount relating to intra-Community trans-
actions. 
3.  Comments 
The Committee would start by pointing out that the Commission's latest proposal is the direct result 
of intense political discussions in all Member States, and follows a number of specific statements 
made by the Council. 
This is an important point since the Council must reach its final decisions as soon as possible- 1 
January 1993 is fast approaching and it would be advisable to have a clear set of rules beforehand. 
10 It is worth repeating that tax policy as a whole is an essential component of all economic policy. It 
is crucial to achieving economic and social cohesion in the Community, improving living conditions 
in a balanced way and ironing out regional disparities. 
On the other hand, the arguments raised during the political debate should not be forgotten or played 
down. The basic reasoning in the Opinions adopted by the Committee since 1988 on VAT and excise 
duties should also be kept in mind. 
There is a clear need for a transitional period, as advocated by the Committee in its Opinion of 19 
December 1989 (CES 1368/89), during which sales of goods continue to be taxed in the country of 
destination. Member States must however be allowed sufficient time to prepare for the definitive 
arrangements. 
All aspects of the final arrangements must be clearly spelled out in all measures taken to help Member 
States adapt to the new system without incurring new budget problems or harming the competi· 
tiveness of their economies. 
When indirect taxation is finally harmonized, it should be harmonized sufficiently closely and steps 
taken to prevent any harmful effects on the Member States' budget, economic and social policies, 
so as not to jeopardize the introduction of economic and monetary union in the Community. 
The Commission's efforts to persuade the Council to simultaneously approve the transitional phase 
and the definitive arrangements therefore deserve support. 
The definitive rates which will be applied or authorized should be made known as soon as possible, 
a clearing system should be defined, whereby taxes are systematically levied in the country of 
consumption, and measures to prevent fraud and tax evasion need to be spelled out. 
The Commission's proposed transitional period is to run from 1 January 1993 until31 December 1996. 
The Commission therefore believes that the final objective can be achieved within a period of four 
years (possibly less). Although it is extremely difficult to judge whether the transitional period is 
adequate, it must be pointed out that the length of the period will depend on the ability and determi· 
nation of Member States to use it in order to approximate their VAT rates and take all the measures 
needed to comply with commitments arising from the final system. Measures to suppress fraud and 
tax evasion will play an important part. 
It is important for VAT rates to be aligned, in stages, before the single European market comes into 
force. In past Opinions the Committee has called for mandatory convergence of Member States' 
national rates within a fixed band. Mandatory convergence was not provided for in the Commission 
proposal set out in the communication of 14 June 1989, mentioned above. Unless a schedule for 
convergence is drawn up, and individual Member States are given assistance, we are likely to find 
ourselves in exactly the same situation at the end of 1996 as we are in now, making it impossible for 
the new system to come into operation. 
Given that the proposal for transitional arrangements stems from the realization that the social, 
economic and political conditions needed to implement a definitive system do not exist at present, 
our first concern must be to ensure that the right conditions do prevail by the end of the transitional 
period. Major  decisions will therefore have to be taken in all areas of taxation, not only indirect taxation. 
Action will also have to be taken to adapt the economic and social situations in the various Member 
States, which have hitherto developed independently of each other, in the light of the way of life, the 
culture and the traditions of their citizens. 
It would certainly be advisable to keep open the option of extending the transitional period in case 
a significant number of the decisions involved have not been taken by 31  December 1996. It will be 
easier to extend the transitional period in this way once it has been seen to work successfully in 
practice. 
The special arrangements outlined in the proposal also raise certain questions and need to be more 
clearly defined. 
11 The special arrangements for mail-order sales cover only orders from catalogues. 
Goods can be advertised in other ways however (e.g. door-to-door leaflets, television, newspapers 
and magazines), with the same results as catalogues; they should also be taken into consideration. 
The Commission seems to be aiming to restrict the scope of mail-order sales under the terms of the 
special arrangements, whereas in fact it should be extended to all distance sales, although they should 
be governed by comprehensive legislation other than that under discussion here. 
The limit of ECU 1 million on mail-order turnover also seems somewhat arbitrary. 
Arrangements applicable to small and medium-sized firms and exempt taxable persons warrant 
special attention. First and foremost, Member States must be asked to harmonize their present 
systems. The new rules must then be set out more clearly than in the present proposal. The new system 
must in any event avoid distortions of competition. 
The combination of free purchasing arrangements for private persons, taxation in the country of origin 
for institutional persons not liable to VAT and fully exempt persons and the threshold for mail-order 
sales (firms with a turnover of less than ECU 1 million) could have a significant effect on the tax revenue 
of net importing countries. 
4.  Conclusions 
The Commission proposal offers a way round the numerous problems besetting the harmonization 
of indirect taxation at the present time, and as such meets with the Committee's approval. This, 
however, is on the understanding that its suggestions and comments, particularly in section 3, are 
taken on board. 
This is an important proposal, as it has major repercussions on the entire economies of the countries 
concerned  and  in  some  cases  calls  for  substantial  revision  of  tax  arrangements.  The  final 
arrangements are not therefore confined to indirect taxation: the whole system of taxation will have 
to be reformed if it is to be uniform and fair. 
Member States which  are  net  importers from  the Community may  also experience  budgetary 
difficulties during the transition period: the Commission and the Council should therefore take the 
necessary steps to deal with problems which may ensue. It should also be  remembered that an 
appropriate offset system will have to operate when the definitive arrangements are in place. 
Priority should be given to minimizing the scope for fraud. 
The proposal for transitional arrangements should therefore be closely linked with the proposal for 
administrative cooperation in the field of indirect taxation. 
Done at Brussels, 19 September 1990. 
12 
The Chairman 
of the Economic and 
Social Committee 
Alberto MASPRONE 
The Secretary-General 
of the Economic and 
Social Committee 
Jacques MOREAU OPINION 
of the Economic and Social Committee 
on the 
Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) concerning administrative 
cooperation in the field of indirect taxation 
(COM(90) 183 final · SYN 275) 
13 On 17 July 1990 the Council decided to consult the Economic and Social Committee, under Article 
100a of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, on the 
Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) concerning administrative cooperation 
in the field of indirect taxation 
(COM(90)  183 final · SYN 275). 
The Committee instructed the Section for Economic, Financial and Monetary Questions to prepare 
its work on the subject. When work was in progress, Mr GIACOMELLI was appointed Rapporteur-
General. 
At its 279th Plenary Session (meeting of 19 September 1990) the Economic and Social Committee 
adopted the following Opinion nem. con. with one abstention: 
*  *  * 
1.  Introduction 
The Committee (Section) approves the content of the present proposal which seeks, in line with the 
conclusions of the ECOFIN  Council  meeting  held  on  13  November 1989,  to create a  specific 
Community legal instrument for improving the effectiveness of administrative cooperation on indirect 
taxation (VAT and excise duties). The Committee's (Section's) approval is nevertheless subject to the 
following provisos: (a) the formalities falling on firms must be reduced, (b) checks must be even-handed 
and not excessively meticulous and (c) the legal basis and form of the Commission proposal must 
be revised. The arguments for a directive rather than a regulation are set out further on. 
2.  Introductory comments and explanations 
The case for the Commission proposal 
The proposed amendment to the draft Council directive supplementing the common system of  value-
added tax and amending Directive 77/388/EEC provides for the establishment of a transitional VAT· 
based taxation scheme. The Commission argues that this and the present proposal are warranted 
by the creation of the internal market and the abolition of fiscal frontiers. The present proposal can, 
moreover, be viewed as a corollary of the first one. 
Both proposals seek to abolish checks on intra-Community cross-border traffic as of  1  January 1993. 
The first proposal, which will be dealt with separately, is principally designed to maintain, with some 
changes, VAT-based taxation in the country of destination, although it does confirm the medium-
term aim of charging VAT in the country of origin. The second proposal concerns a regulation (rather 
than  a  directive)  which  would  be  directly applicable  in  every  Member State;  the explanatory 
memorandum and the draft regulation proper indicate that the proposal springs from the need to 
strengthen existing provisions for administrative cooperation or mutual assistance in matters of 
indirect taxation, the main argument being the abolition of fiscal frontiers. 
As there will no longer be any customs checks at intra-Community frontiers, national fiscal controls 
will be based first and foremost on the verification of traders' accounts for intra-Community trans-
actions. It is vital that the current mutual assistance arrangements be backed up by "a much more 
developed and comprehensive system of cooperation", as proposed in Council Directive 79/1070/EEC 
of 6 December 1979 (OJ  L 331/8). This is necessary as each Member State will be responsible for 
checking the accounts of its own taxable persons, in order not only to curtail the risk of evasion and 
irregularities, particularly under the transitional arrangements, but also to ensure that the tax is 
collected in the country of destination, i.e. where the goods are consumed. Appropriate arrangements 
were provided for in document COM (87) 323 of 5 August 1987 on the introduction of a VAT clearing 
mechanism for intra-Community sales. The  idea of a clearing house has been dropped in the 
15 meantime, but the abolition of fiscal frontiers, to be accompanied by the abolition of the Single 
Administrative  Document  accompanying  goods  principally  for the  purposes  of fiscal  control, 
nevertheless requires an improvement in administrative cooperation, which has hitherto been confined 
to mutual assistance in the event of evasion or suspected evasion. 
Finally, the Commission refers to the conclusions of the ECOFIN Council of 13 November 1989; the 
Council ruled  out the idea of country-of-origin based taxation in  the near future, due to major 
disagreements between Member States inter alia on (a) the principles and procedures for concomitant 
alignment of VAT rates and (b) compensation arrangements between debtor and creditor States. The 
Council did, however, accept the need for checks to ensure effective protection against the risk of 
evasion. These arrangements would essentially be  based on (a)  national monitoring of business 
returns, (b) regular information exchange and (c) the communication of documentation established 
by the administration. The Council felt that administrative cooperation "must not give rise to any 
obstacle  on  grounds  of  national  legislation  and  will  supplement  existing  mutual  assistance 
procedures". 
The Commission views the present proposal as a major component of the three-tier measures : (i) 
transitional VAT scheme, (ii) administrative cooperation, (iii) statistics, designed to eliminate controls 
at intra-Community frontiers  in  the Internal Market as  of 1 January 1993.  The  legislation must 
effectively combat evasion and also help build up trust between the administrations responsible for 
applying the new arrangements. At her press conference on 8 May 1990, Commissioner SCRIVENER 
pointed out that such trust was necessary both for the transitional and the final VAT scheme; the 
final scheme should in theory replace the transitional one from 1 January 1997, following an overall 
examination of the matter by the Council to determine, on the Commission's proposal, arrangements 
for final standardization of the common VAT system (cf COM(90) 182 final-SYN 27 4 of 19 June 1990, 
point 3). 
Current situation 
The  proposal  covers  administrative cooperation  on  indirect taxation.  It should  be  noted  that 
Community legislation does not yet provide for mutual assistance in the administration of excise 
duties as it does in the case of VAT. In accordance with Articles 1 and 2, the regulation therefore had 
to make express reference to these excise duties. In the event, the indirect taxes concerned are listed 
in Article 5, Title II: value-added tax; excise duty on manufactured tobacco products; excise duty on 
alcoholic beverages and alcohol contained in other products; excise duty on mineral oils. Conse-
quently Titles I,  Ill et seq. implicitly apply also to administrative cooperation and to exchange of 
information on such duties. 
For administrative cooperation on VAT, the Commission decided to invoke the legislative framework 
provided by Council Directive 7911070 EEC concerning mutual assistance by the competent authorities 
of the Member States in the field of indirect taxation. 
The Commission also cited two other references: (i) Regulation EEC 1468/81 on mutual assistance 
in customs and agricultural matters, as amended by Regulation EEC 945/87, and (ii) the 1967 Naples 
Convention which provides for mutual assistance between customs administrations, but is not a 
Community instrument. 
If, as the Commission states, current Community legislation on mutual assistance provides a sound 
basis for administrative cooperation on VAT, it would appear that these measures have not been widely 
deployed, as Member States have decided that their own national checking procedures, using import 
and export documents, are adequate for effective control. 
Information received from the relevant authorities, does indeed indicate that these instruments, 
namely Council Directive 79/1070/EEC- have only been used haphazardly, in cases of evasion or 
suspected evasion, and within the limits set down in Article 7(2) (Provisions relating to secrecy) and 
8 (Limits to  exchange of information) of Council Directive 77/799/EEC on assistance in matters of direct 
taxation, extended to VAT by Directive 79/1070/EEC. 
Administrative cooperation is due to become standard practice once fiscal frontiers have been 
removed;  it will be  part of a system of checking procedures based on  Member States' own "a 
16 posteriori" checks of tax declarations. Current arrangements are based on "a priori" checks of trans-
actions by the customs. The Commission holds the view that it can fulfil the mandate assigned by 
the Council by proposing a new legal instrument to improve administrative cooperation between 
Member States on indirect taxation. 
The arrangements to apply from 1 January 1993 
Checks will be carried out under national tax arrangements and will be based on "a posteriori" verifi-
cation of tax declarations. 
Periodical VAT declarations show: 
total VAT payments and deductions; 
- the volume of intra-Community sales and purchases. 
This is sufficient to process VAT. 
Checks are carried out on firms' accounts (on the spot and on the basis of documentation) thus 
allowing: 
checks on firms' stocks; 
checks on exemption conditions in connection with the shipment of goods to another Member 
State, 
order forms, 
invoices, 
certificates, 
transport documents. 
Improved cooperation between administrations will allow: 
mutual assistance in cases of evasion or suspected evasion; 
- "on request" cooperation in respect of routine checks; 
- spontaneous assistance and communication of information. 
Provision has been made, inter alia, for administrations to make reciprocal checks by means of random 
sampling, on whether a declared export is matched by an equivalent import and vice versa. Any 
information requested in this way must be communicated to the applicant Member State within 3 
months. 
The reduction in  paperwork (such as abolition of the transit advice note, soon to be  followed by 
abolition of the Single Administrative Document) will thus be reflected in firms' statistics. Proposals 
in this sphere, such as the Amended proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) on the statistics relating 
to the trading of goods between Member States (COM(90) 177 final-SYN 181 of 27 June 1990), mean 
that the Single Administrative Document (with up to 55 entries) will be replaced by a form comprising 
only 10 statistical entries for the largest firms (under 20°/o of Community firms). Other firms, however, 
will only have to supply two additional figures in their periodical VAT declarations, i.e. their total 
Community imports and total Community exports. 
In the absence of any indication to the contrary, the impression prevails that the proposed instrument 
will apply to both the transitional and final schemes, irrespective of  the decisions taken by the Council 
on VAT or excise duties. 
Notwithstanding recent Commission proposals on excise duties (heavily criticized by the Committee 
in its Opinions on these proposals: CES 1328/89, CES63/90, CES 135190 and CES275/90of5July 1990), 
the proposed arrangements seem even less concrete than those on VAT; in any case, the tax will 
continue to be charged in the country of destination, i.e. where the goods are consumed. The operation 
of integrated monitoring systems for goods attracting excise duty and being transported under 
exemption arrangements still has to be defined in detail. The Commission merely notes that the 
cooperation arrangements here will have to be similar to those for VAT. 
17 Administrative cooperation 
There will be two distinct but related types of cooperation under the new legal instrument. 
Existing mutual assistance procedures for dealing with cases of evasion or serious irregularity (still 
to be defined) will be continued. These procedures will operate largely on a bilateral basis, but will 
need  to be  incorporated into a Community framework and  codified in  a Community instrument 
(regulation). 
Furthermore, a new type of adminstative cooperation is to be introduced in order to achieve the 
principal goal of the present proposal: to exchange information for the purposes of checking intra-
Community transactions subject to VAT and excise duties, after fiscal checks at intra-Community 
frontiers have been abolished. 
Provision has been made for three categories of assistance: 
Assistance on request, where the initiative lies with the applicant authority; 
Automatic assistance, where both applicant and requested authorities agree in advance to exchange 
information; 
Spontaneous assistance, where one authority deems it necessary to take the intitiative without being 
requested to do so. 
Assistance on request is and will probably remain the most frequently used category. 
3.  General comments: remarks on the content and form of the proposal 
If the system is to operate flexibly and without excessive evasion, closer cooperation between national 
indirect tax authorities will be vital once fiscal controls and formalities have been abolished in the 
run-up to the internal market; this will undoubtedly hold true for both transitional (as proposed by 
the Commission) and definitive arrangements (to be adopted by the Council after examination of the 
Commission's ad hoc sugggestions, for implementation by 1 January 1997). 
The current legal basis for the proposal is Article 100 A of the Treaty; this is dubious insofar as it is 
intended to disregard Article 100 A (2)  which states that "paragraph 1 shall not apply to fiscal 
provisions".lt seems that the Commission intends to circumvent the unanimity rule by implicitly giving 
a restrictive interpretation of the derogation contained in paragraph 2 and deciding that paragraph 
1 will apply irrespective of paragraph 2; the Commission view is that since the proposed measures 
to step up administrative cooperation on indirect taxation are purely executive they only require a 
qualified majority. This is by  no means certain; fiscal provisions cover the tax, its introduction, 
assessment basis, rate, establishment and collection; close scrutiny of the Commission proposal 
reveals that it deals specifically with the establishment of the taxes, in that Article 1 introduces 
cooperation between administrations and with the Commission in order to ensure a) compliance with 
legislation on indirect taxation and b) correct establishment of the taxes. 
Moreover, it is reasonable to ask why no reference has been made to Article 99 of the Treaty since, 
within the  framework of wider improved  administrative cooperation  which  implies the correct 
assessment of indirect taxes, the proposed new provisions broach the issue of alignment of legislation 
on turnover taxes, excise duties and other indirect taxes, insofar as such alignment is necessary to 
secure the establishment and operation of the internal market within the deadline set in Article BA 
(which is not disputed here). In any case, point 5 of the explanatory memorandum does not provide 
convincing arguments for using Article 100A as the legal basis. If the Commission has opted for a 
regulation instead of a directive it should be aware that regulations can also be adopted under Article 
99. In any case and in the absence of more convincing arguments to the contrary, Article 99 appears 
to provide the most appropriate bedrock for the proposal. 
It is extremely significant to point out here that in reply to a question raised by the Ad Hoc Group 
on the Abolition of Fiscal Frontiers, the EC Council's legal service issued an Opinion on 16 July last 
18 stating categorically that "Article 99 of the EC Treaty is the proper legal basis for application of the 
Commission proposal." The Opinion contained highly pertinent arguments which in some respects 
overlapped with those put forward by the Committee (Section). 
It is equally debatable whether a regulation is the best and most appropriate instrument for this case. 
Assistance between fiscal administrations in applying tax legislation to individuals or taxable persons 
(Article 7(2) and Article 9 of the Proposal) and in assessing the correct tax in most Member States 
requires statutory legislation rather than executive action. In other words, whether or not procedures 
such as this Commission Proposal are enacted will depend on a) national parliaments and b) Member 
States' unanimity. 
A regulation would be directly applicable to the individual, and would give no role to the Member State; 
the Proposal in question provides for contact between taxable persons via their respective Member 
States, with no Community involvement; so there is no need for a Regulation, nor would one be 
warranted. Point 16 of the Explanatory Memorandum is not a strong enough argument for a Regulation 
on its own. 
The most appropriate legal instrument is therefore a Directive based on Treaty Article 99, both in terms 
of interpretation of the Treaty (fiscal provisions as set out in Article 100A (2)) and in terms of the 
Proposal's content. 
Moreover, close examination of Article 19 of the Proposal (consultation and coordination procedures) 
reveals optional arrangements, vague measures, undetermined procedures all of which leave a 
considerable amount of latitude more appropriate to a Directive but incompatible with a Regulation 
which is interpreted literally and is directly applicable. This is yet another argument for a Directive, 
together with the fact that the instrument which the present Proposal is designed to replace (Article 
22 of the Proposal repeals this text) is also a Directive. 
4.  Specific comments 
second recital 
the second recital is based on false premises i.e. it refers to "fiscal harmonization measures taken 
for completion of the internal market"; in the current situation this is controversial at the very 
least; a Regulation adopted by the Council under these conditions would subsequently expose 
it to restrictions to which it had implicitly subscribed and which would prejudge a final decision 
which was its prerogative. This recital should therefore be amended to read as follows: "whereas 
in order to give full effect to the abolition of frontier controls while avoiding fiscal revenue losses 
for Member States, the measures taken for the transitional period in the interests of completing 
the internal market require the establishment .... etc." 
third recital 
the third recital quite rightly refers to provisions whose objective is, by setting up a cooperation 
system, to abolish frontier controls in line with Article 8A of the Treaty. This is in fact the aim 
of the present Proposal which, contrary to the second recital, cannot invoke fiscal alignment 
measures which have not yet been taken; notwithstanding the third recital, the Proposal effectively 
provides for an  alignment of fiscal measures under the terms of Article 100A (2);  as indirect 
taxation is involved, the legal basis of Article 99 then comes into play. 
eleventh (penultimate) recital 
the second last recital lists instances where a Member State is entitled to refuse to undertake 
research or supply information; these same cases, however, are not listed in Article 18 and 
paragraph 1 of this Article cites only one example, namely the likelihood of prejudicing public 
policy! Consequently this oversight should be remedied by completing the list in Article 18 (1). 
19 Article 1 
As has already been pointed out in the general comments, the proposal in question effectively entails 
the harmonization of  fiscal provisions insofar as it seeks, through cooperation between the adminis-
trative authorities responsible in the Member States for the application of the indirect tax legislation, 
to ensure compliance with such legislation as well as a correct assessment of  the taxes in question. 
Article 1 thus inexplicitly brings into play EEC Treaty Article 99 which is concerned with the harmoni-
zation of legislation on indirect taxation. 
Article 3 
Article 3 provides for the logical and necessary cooperation between the competent authorities of 
the Member States. Except in special cases, such cooperation will be mainly bilateral in kind. The 
Commission is also involved, insofar as Community legislation is or will be affected and steps have 
to be taken to ensure compliance with Community provisions on indirect taxation. 
The second paragraph of Article 3 states at the end that the competent authorities shall communicate 
"any specific or general information to the Commission when this may be of interest at Community 
level"  .It  would be helpful here if the Commission would make clear exactly what type of information 
it has in mind. Vague wording is out of place in proposals as far-reaching as this. 
Article 5 
Article 5,  which deals with administrative assistance, is concerned with requests made by the 
applicant authority to the  requested  authority to divulge all  information· necessary to ensure 
compliance with the legislation on indirect taxation. The Article then lists the taxes and duties falling 
within the scope of the proposal: VAT plus excise duties on manufactured tobacco products, alcoholic 
beverages and mineral oils. Would it not have been better to have defined the scope of the proposal 
in Article 1 rather than in Article 5 so that the reader would have got his bearings right from the start? 
Article 5 would also be more complete if it were to incorporate the second sentence of Article 2(1) 
of Directive 7717991EEC on mutual assistance in the field of direct taxation (now equally applicable, 
via Directive 79110701EEC, to mutual assistance in the field of indirect taxation) which states that the 
requested authority need not comply with the request if it appears that the applicant authority "has 
not exhausted its own usual sources of information which it could have utilized, according to the 
circumstances, to obtain the information requested without running the risk of endangering the 
attainment of the sought after result". 
Assistance on request will no doubt be the most frequently used type of cooperation during the transi-
tional period. 
Article 7 
Article 7 deals with cases of coordinated tax examinations where two or more authorities have a 
common or related interest, each in its own territory, in examining the indirect tax affairs of a person 
or persons with a view to exchanging the information which they so obtain. It is questionable whether 
such a provision can be effective if, as the first paragraph states, "each authority involved shall decide 
whether or not it wishes to participate in a particular coordinated tax examination". The provision 
should at least set out the criteria which can justify a party wishing to opt out of a coordinated tax 
examination. 
Article 11 
This Article is concerned with the information referred to in Article 3 being exchanged automatically, 
regularly and  without prior request  "for categories of cases which shall be  determined by  the 
competent authorities under the procedures laid down in Article 19)". 
It is not easy to express a view on the exact scope of Article 11 since it is an outline provision and 
certain parts still remain to be clarified under the procedures laid down. 
20 Article 13(1)(b) 
This provision is initially confusing. It would therefore help to word it more clearly so that the 
uninitiated can understand it better. 
Article 13(2) 
Like a number of  other  provisions, this paragraph suffers from the uncertainty  surrounding Articte 19. 
Article 13(3) 
Are the "other Member States" who are to receive the information referred to ln paragraphs 1 and 
2 the Member States actually affected or concerned by such information? If this is the case, then 
it should be spelt out in paragraph 3. 
Article 15 
Comment is inappropriate here as the first part of Article 15(1) depends on arrangements still to be 
agreed under the procedures laid down in Article 19. Article 15(2) should also make provision for 
refusals to supply information, with an obligation on the requested authority to state its reasons (e.g. 
when the request from an applicant authority is accompanied by an application from a court authority). 
Refusal to supply information is moreover provided for in Directive 77/799/EEC on mutual assistance 
in  the field  of direct taxation (which through  Directive 79/1070/EEC  likewise regulates mutual 
assistance in the field of indirect taxation). 
Article 16 
This important Article is difficult to interpret. It is therefore regrettable that its provisions likewise 
depend on procedures which still remain to be determined under the provisions laid down in Article 
19, which are moreover insufficiently explicit. 
Article 17 
The opening lines of Article 17(1) expressly state that any information communicated shall be of a 
confidential nature and shall be covered by the obligation of professional secrecy. This would seem 
to be redundant since access to such information is to be confined exclusively to civil servants who 
are bound to secrecy by their terms of employment. The wording of the equivalent provision (Article 
7(1) of the directive on mutual assistance in the field of direct taxation, likewise applicable to indirect 
taxation through directive 79/1070/EEC) is clearer and more concise and so should be incorporated 
lock, stock and barrel in Article 17(1) of the present proposal. 
Article 18 
It has already been pointed out above that Article 18(1) is incomplete insofar as it cites only one of 
the reasons given in the eleventh (penultimate) recital of the proposal entitling Member States to refuse 
to carry out enquiries or  to provide information. Apart from the case where the provision of information 
would be contrary to public policy, the recital also states that a Member State has the right of refusal 
where its laws prevent its indirect tax administration from undertaking such enquiries or from 
collecting or using such information for its own purposes (the "own account" use of information 
originating rather in Article 5(2). 
Article 18(1) should therefore be completed accordingly. 
Article 19 
Given the uncertainties which pervade this outline provision concerning as yet unspecified consultation 
and coordination procedures, not to mention other reasons given under the "General comments", it is 
virtually inconceivable that a Regulation should be proposed as the legal instrument for administrative 
cooperation in the field of indirect taxation when a Directive -which would also repeal and replace an 
existing Directive on the same subject- would be more appropriate. Provisions such as those in Article 
19 are more appropriate for a Directive than a Regulation which must be based on criteria of clarity, 
precision and literal interpretation. This is all the more so since taxation is concerned. 
21 It would also undoubtedly have been simpler to invoke Article 9 of the Directive on mutual assistance 
in the field of direct taxation (likewise valid for indirect taxation), incorporating it, mutatis mutandis, 
into the present proposal and leaving Member States and their competent authorities as much 
freedom as possible to work out the actual details of cooperation, subject to observance of the 
principles of subsidiarity and national fiscal sovereignty. 
General Comment 
In the light of the above comments, the word "regulation" should be replaced by "directive" in the 
various clauses of the new proposal. 
Final comment 
The Committee would stress that, in order to ensure the successful aboliton of tax frontiers on 1 
January 1983, there must be neither discussion nor deferred decision in the Council on the package 
of three measures relating respectively to the transitional VAT arrangements (COM(90) 182 final), 
administrative cooperation in the field of indirect taxation (COM(90) 183 final) and statistics relating 
to the trading of goods between Member States (COM(90) 177 final). The three proposals are closely 
interlinked and the relevant discussions and decisions should occur simultaneously. 
5.  Conclusion 
Assuming that Directive 79/1070/EEC of 6 December 1979, even if duly amended, will be unable to 
cope with the situation prevailing after 1 January 1993 (when there will be a system of ex post facto 
tax controls, following the abolition of checks on intra-Community cross-border traffic), it is necessary 
and indeed essential to step up mutual assistance and administrative cooperation in the field of 
indirect taxation. Subject to the above comments, the Committee (Section) therefore endorses the 
Commission's proposals on the assumption that definitive solutions will eventually be found in the 
fields of taxation, administrative cooperation and intra-Community trade statistics, thus ensuring 
that tax revenue is justly and equitably allocated to the entitled parties, i.e. the Member State where 
the goods in question are finally consumed, without a complex, expensive compensatory mechanism 
on which the Committee expressed such strong reservations in its Opinion (ESC 742/88) of 7 July 1988 
on document (COM(87) 323. 
Done at Brussels, 19 September 1990. 
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23 On 22 January 1990 the Council decided to consult the Economic and Social Committee, under Article 
198 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, on the 
Commission  Communication  to  the  Council  entitled  "New  Commission 
Approach to Excise-Duty Rates" 
(COM(89) 551  final). 
The Section for Economic, Financial and Monetary Questions, which was responsible for preparing 
the Committee's work on the matter, adopted its Opinion on 21  June 1990. The Rapporteur was Mr 
DELLA CROCE. 
At its 278th Plenary Session (meeting of 5 July) the Economic and Social Committee adopted the 
following Opinion by a large majority, with 7 votes against and 4 abstentions: 
*  *  * 
1.  The Commission proposal 
In 1987 the Commission proposed single rates for the whole of the Community. 
To introduce an element of flexibility in the case of VAT, the Commission proposed that standard 
rates be allowed to vary within a band of six percentage points whilst reduced rates would have a 
spread of five percentage points. In the case of excise duties, however, the Commission opted for 
rigidity, claiming that: 
"any  flexibility  in  the  rate  of duty  which  might  be  permitted  would  be 
compounded with the permitted margin for VAT rates and would therefore result 
in tax-induced price differentials well in excess of  5%. "(
1 J. 
Agreeing with the comments made by the Member States and European Parliament, the Commission 
now rejects the case for rigidity and proposes some degree of flexibility. 
This degree of flexiblity would consist of setting minimum rates for all dutiable products with the 
exception of certain petroleum products (diesel, heating gas-oil, heavy fuel oil) where rate bands would 
have to be fixed because of the higher risks of distorted competition. 
The  Commision also proposes benchmark i.e.  "target rates" which, in the case of tobacco and 
alcoholic beverages,  are  higher than the single rates envisaged  in  the Commission's previous 
proposal. 
The target rates are to be the long-term objective of all the Member States. 
The Commission has also committed itself to presenting proposals on the movement of products 
subject to excise duties, as well as on the operation of interconnected warehouses for the movement 
of goods under duty-suspension arrangements. 
2.  Comments 
The problem of excise duties has to be seen in the larger context of indirect taxation and for that matter 
the taxation system as a whole. 
Being consumer taxes, excise duties have very different histories in  the Member States of the 
Community. On occasions they have been used to solve practical and urgent budgetary problems 
and at other times they have been used to curb the consumption of individual products either in the 
general interest or to protect public health. 
Generally speaking, and particularly in the past, excise duties have met with popular hostility because 
they  have  tended  to reduce  purchasing  power and  in  some cases  even  be  charged  on  basic 
necessities. 
(1)  COM(87) 320 final, page 15. 
25 Efforts have been made in the Community to reduce the number of products subject to excise duties 
so that the principal dutiable products left today are alcoholic beverages, tobacco and mineral oils. 
Nevertheless, those tax rates and structures still in existence vary greatly from Member State to 
Member State; trying to harmonize them is therefore no easy matter. 
The Single European Market will clearly have to be underpinned by a uniform taxation system if goods 
are to circulate freely without distorting competition. Having said this, the excise duty problem will 
not be easy to solve unless it is tackled within the context of general taxation policy (and not only 
indirect taxation). 
It is important first of all to say how difficult it is to deliver an Opinion on a general communication 
which deals solely with excise duties but does not make clear the position and intentions of the 
Commission regarding the actual implementation of the new system. We are told nothing about how 
the duties will.be collected, what arrangements will govern the movement and storage of goods, and 
what controls will or may have to be imposed. 
The Committee regrets these lacunae which circumscribe the scope of this Opinion. 
The campaign to harmonize excise duties is limited in the latest proposal to a) fixing minimum rates· 
and b) setting target values for longer-term convergence. 
This is done to introduce an "element of flexibility", a concept which on careful analysis is misplaced. 
Member States in fact will be required, from 1 January 1993, to raise their current rates if they fall 
below the proposed minimum rates, whereas they will be under no obligation to make adjustments 
should their rates be higher. 
The proposed package thus falls short of what is required if the Single European Market is to become 
a reality and tax frontiers are to be dismantled. 
In 1987 the Commission in fact said that the Single Market could only be achieved if common rates 
of excise duty were charged on harmonized structures.<
2l 
It is also necessary to make clear that excise duties can only be fully justified if they are based on 
objective tax criteria for each category of product; at the present time the differences in such tax 
criteria are substantial. 
The combination of widely differing excise duties and VAT rates can have a very considerable impact 
on consumer prices and consequently on terms of competition. 
Implementation of the present Commission proposal will thus have little effect on real harmonization. 
Are  we  therefore not entitled to ask whether there  is  any  real  point in  tinkering  with present 
arrangements and encroaching on the autonomy of individual Member States when the results will 
in any case be of dubious or limited value? 
What the dismantling of tax frontiers and the free movement of private individuals (an  inviolable 
objective) will undoubtedly do is make it easy and convenient to purchase goods wherever taxes and 
therefore prices are lower, thereby generating a considerable trade flow. 
Restrictions on the movement of goods might consequently be introduced even if such action is 
incompatible with the Single European Market. 
In the absence of any very close approximation of excise duties, it might be necessary to draw up 
rules and agreements on the purchase and transport of dutiable goods even though such rules and 
agreements should not prejudice free competition and not affect the rights of individual European 
citizens. Any controls should therefore be aimed solely at preventing tax fraud and unauthorized 
business and should be carried out in exactly the same way as they are at national level. 
Under no cicumstances will it be possible to have the kind of controls we currently have at our frontiers. 
Excise duties should be harmonized at the lowest possible levels, provided the latter are compatible 
with economic requirements and with policies designed to restrict the consumption of individual 
products, sometimes for health reasons. 
(2)  COM(87) 320 final 
26 Harmonization should also take into account the need to avoid undue distortions of competition 
between products subject and those not subject to excise duties. 
Excise duties tend in any case to be an obsolete form of taxation so we cannot preclude the possibility 
of their being abolished in the more or less long-term future. 
Economic requirements are by their very nature likely to ensure compliance with the principle whereby 
excise duties should be a tax on consumption and not on the factors of production-a principle which 
the Commission has itself defended (doc (73) 1234 fin- 1 August 1973). 
On the other hand we also need to remember that excise duties are a very important source of revenue 
in some Member States. A very significant drop in excise duties would therefore entail significant changes 
in these countries' taxation systems. Time will accordingly be needed to implement the changes. 
Since this is the reality we are confronted with, it will be necessary to act in a highly pragmatic manner, 
lay down appropriate time-scales and make appropriate adjustments to present arrangements. This 
means  laying  precise  obligations  on  all  Member  States  and  pre-determining  the  stages  of 
convergence, even if these carry us beyond the introduction of the Single Market. 
The whole operation must be conducted in such a way that the abolition of frontiers does not give 
rise to fraud, tax evasion or serious distortions of trade. Nor must an unnecessarily heavy burden 
be placed on commercial activities. 
3.  Conclusions 
The Economic and Social Committee reaffirms the validity of the Opinions on excise duties delivered 
in 1988 whilst accepting that adjustments will have to be made because of the present situation. 
The Commission's present communication requires substantial modifications before it can be approved. 
To be able to make an accurate and thorough assessment of the excise duty proposals, we would also 
need to be familiar with the proposals on the collection of duties, the movement of goods, controls, 
bonded warehouse regulations, the marking of individual products and all other relevant aspects. 
Minimum and maximum rates need to be fixed for all categories of goods subject to excise duties. 
By doing so, rates will be confined within mandatory bands. 
Since  significant changes  in  existing  rates  might cause  problems  for some  Member States, 
convergence towards the new bands should be allowed to continue after the introduction of the Single 
European Market. 
In  general, the minimum and target rates proposed by the Commission are too high. The bands 
mentioned in the present Opinion should be consolidated at a lower level, especially in the case of 
certain products. 
The Opinions which the Committee will be delivering on individual proposals will provide more detailed 
and specific information. 
Done at Brussels, 5 July 1990. 
The Chairman 
of the Economic and 
Social Committee 
Alberto MASPRONE 
The Secretary-General 
of the Economic and 
Social Committee 
Jacques MOREAU 
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29 On 22 January 1990 the Council decided to consult the Economic and Social Committee, under Article 
198 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, on the 
Amended proposal for a Council Directive on the approximation of taxes on 
cigarettes 
and the 
Amended proposal for a Council Directive on the approximation of taxes on 
manufactured tobacco other than cigarettes 
(COM(89) 525 final). 
The Section for Economic, Financial and Monetary Questions, which was responsible for preparing 
the Committee's work on the subject, adopted its Opinion on 21 June 1990. The Rapporteur was Mr 
DELLA CROCE. 
At its 278th Plenary Session (meeting of 5 July 1990), the Economic and Social Committee adopted 
the following Opinion by a large majority, with five dissenting votes and no abstentions. 
*  *  * 
1.  The Commission proposal 
As for other goods subject to excise duties, the Commission has modified its position and abandoned 
the idea of having a single rate. It now proposes that minimum mandatory rates should be introduced 
on 1 January 1993. The period after that date will see gradual alignment on bench mark values known 
as "target rates". 
The proposed rates are tabu  Ia  ted below: 
Previous proposal  Minimum on  Target 
1 January 1993 
Cigarettes (1 000)  19.5 Ecu  +  15 Ecu  +  21.5 Ecu  + 
12-54°/o  retail price  45°/o  retail price  54 °/o  retai I price 
Cigars and cigarillos  34-36°/o  25°/o  36°/o 
Smoking tobacco  54-56°/o  50°/o  56°/o 
Snuff  41-43°/o  37°/o  43°/o 
The Commission thus proposes a mixed tax (fixed specific duty plus ad valorem duty) for cigarettes, 
and an ad valorem tax for other tobacco items. VAT is to be added to the excise duty for the calculation 
of the percentage figure. 
The Council is to examine the rates every two years and make any necessary adjustments. 
The Commission proposes an  ad  valorem tax for manufactured tobacco other than cigarettes. 
However, it also proposes a derogation allowing Member States which on 31  December 1992 apply 
either a purely specific tax or a mixed tax to use a mixed structure for a further five years, provided 
that its total value is no lower than the minimum rates. This will allow these Member States to make 
the transition gradually. 
2.  General comments 
As with all products on which excise duty is levied, the price of cigarettes and tobacco is subject 
to a duty whose sole purpose is to limit consumption and/or increase tax receipts in a simple manner. 
The effect on the final price is considerable, and is in part divorced from the value of the product and 
in part linked exclusively to quantity. The significant differences in existing tax structures make it 
difficult to arrive at a unified structure. 
31 At the same time, while the Commission's intention of intervening solely to strike a middle point 
between differing positions so as not to upset the internal market is understandable from a practical 
viewpoint, it is difficult to justify in more general terms. 
The changes could have a very wide impact on agricultural and production policy, trade, and health 
protection. 
A more general approach is thus needed. 
The Commission states that it is abandoning the proposal to use single rates because it recognizes 
the need for flexibility. 
There is no doubt that the rules originally proposed were too rigid. However the new flexibility must 
leave Member States some freedom to vary their rates and structures, whilst laying down a process 
at the end of which the situation will be the same throughout the Community. 
The flexibility proposed by the Commission is in fact illusory. 
Member States which currently apply rates lower than the minimums proposed will have to alter their 
structures and increase their rates up to these minimums; Member States whose duties are already 
above the minimums will not be obliged to do anything. The only flexibility is the theoretical freedom 
to move closer to the target rates, which are merely indicative. For these rates, the Commission uses 
the phrase "in the longer term". This can have no practical significance, as it sets no specific time-limit. 
The differences between rates after 1 January 1993 would still be considerable. It might be felt that 
these differences could create problems for the Single Market, particularly as the content of the other 
proposals needed to implement the Directive is not yet known. 
Furthermore, it is very difficult (if not practically impossible) to consider the problem fully without 
being acquainted with such proposals as those on collection of the tax, transportation of the products, 
free warehouses, and authorizations for the tax to be paid in the country of consumption. 
It is reasonable to assume that Member States are likely to align their VAT rates downwards, on 
competition grounds. This is less likely in the case of excise duties because of budgetary requirements 
-though these also apply to VAT- and because other criteria are at play (tradition, the need to limit 
consumption, and so on). 
This is particularly true of tobaccos, whose consumption is discouraged for health reasons. 
The Committee Opinion on the original proposal<
1
> remains valid, and particularly the conclusions 
thereof. 
In particular, it must be emphasized that the proposal as a whole takes insufficient account of the 
circumstances of an internal market without customs barriers. In such a market, it is not only the 
excise levels that will be important, but also their structure and the methods of collection and control. 
Since the basic principle of abolition of tax and customs frontiers cannot be called into question, 
the problem  of controls will become signficant.  However,  free  movement of persons must be 
guaranteed, and individuals will be able to purchase goods (even if excise duty is levied on them) in 
any Member State and take them wherever they wish. Controls must only apply to businesses, i.e. 
to goods destined for sale. Excise duty will thus have to take on the nature of a consumer tax, and 
fraud will have to be combatted. 
The low weight and high value of tobacco products means that consumers can buy them far from 
their place of residence. Excise duty represents a high proportion of their price. In the absence of 
border controls, a wide divergency of rates would thus encourage cross-border shopping. 
For countries which currently apply low excise rates, the proposal will mean significant price rises, 
particularly of the most popular brands. The effects which this could have on inflation are difficult 
to predict. 
(1)  CES 744/88 
32 In some cases, it might even tead to a significant increase in smuggling from third countries. 
VAT is to be aggregated with the mixed tax proposed for cigarettes (specific excise duty plus ad 
valorem duty) and with the ad valorem tax proposed for other tobacco items. 
In this way, VAT on tobacco loses its basic characteristic; it is assimilated into an excise duty, and 
requires prior determination of the retail price. 
This represents a serious distortion of normal VAT implementation. 
It is a serious affront to a tax which is the keystone of the whole indirect taxation system, and whose 
regulations are the greatest success of the Community's tax policy. 
3.  Specific comments on the proposal on cigarettes 
The Committee Opinion on the original proposal recognized that a mixed tax was the only basis for 
a compromise o'n a common system. 
Doubts remain, however, as to the judiciousness of the proposed mix of specific duty and ad valorem 
duty. The aggregate sum (inclusive of VAn might also be felt inequitable. 
Harmonization of the components of the tax on cigarettes must allow retail prices as a whole to reflect 
fairly the differences in prices net of tax. The burden of adjustment must be shared fairly between 
Member States. 
The arithmetical mean proposed by the Commission would signify that 30°/o divergences in prices 
net of tax would entail divergences of only 10°/o  in retail prices. 
The proposal will penalize consumers of cheaper brands of cigarette in the seven Member States 
where the specific duty is currently much lower than even the proposed minimum rate. This would 
increase consumption of higher-priced brands. 
It would also have adverse effects on Community tobacco production. 
Seven countries would have to increase their specific duties as follows: 
Belgium  274°/o 
Greece  1415°/o 
Spain  1192°/o 
France  483 °/o 
Italy  625 °/o 
Luxembourg  706°/o 
Portugal  470°/o 
These percentages are high partly because they refer to very low specific duties. Nevertheless they 
highlight the major differences in tax structure. The changes to this structure would be significant, 
and  would  be  difficult for the countries concerned  to stomach; apart from  anything else,  the 
Community would be adopting a very different approach to the one used by these countries hitherto. 
Although the changes in the structure of excise duties would not greatly affect average prices, they 
would have a significant impact on the prices of the cheaper brands. 
4.  Specific comments on manufactured tobacco other than cigarettes 
An ad valorem tax is proposed for these products. 
As two of the three countries where consumption of smoking tobacco is highest currently use a mixed 
tax, it might be better to use this system in future, as the Committee suggested in its 1988 Opinion 
(see Point 5.4.1. of the Opinion of 7 July 1988). 
33 The proposed derogation for the duty rate on smoking tobacco seems wrong. Article 3b allows Member 
States which impose a mixed tax (specific plus ad valorem) to continue to do so for up to five years, 
provided that the sum of the ad valorem components is not less than the minimum rates laid down 
in Article 3a. For smoking tobacco, this rate is 50°/o. Article 3 of the proposal specifies that the total 
tax burden resulting from the combination of excise duty and VAT should be 56°/o. This makes it 
impossible to insert a fair rate of specific duty into the total tax burden. 
Cigars and cigarillos 
These products require special attention, not least because the Community cigar industry is suffering 
a structural crisis. The rate now being proposed is considerably lower than the rate proposed in 1987, 
but is still too high. It would be better to turn the proposed minimum rate into the target rate, and 
set a lower minimum. 
Snuff and chewing tobacco 
These products account for only 0.8°/o of manufactured tobacco consumption, and it is anachronistic 
to continue to levy excise duty on them. 
Their use should be discouraged, but other methods than taxation should be found to achieve this goal. 
5.  Conclusions 
The Committee would draw attention to its Opinion (CES 744/88) on the original Commission proposal. 
Its comments on the need to know how the taxes are to be collected, controls, and the possible 
customs warehouse arrangements, all remain particularly relevant. The Committee remains especially 
concerned about the lack of documentation regarding the effects of the proposal on the structure 
of the tobacco industry, employment, agriculture, government revenue, and consumer spending. 
The  Community  clearly  lacks  a  coherent  overall  policy on  tobacco.  While  some  intervention 
instruments seek to help producers, taxation policy tends to reduce consumption of Community 
tobacco without giving similar disincentives for the consumption of imported tobacco. Competition 
problems are also aggravated by a reduction in consumer price differentials and the need to set price 
levels in advance. 
The Commission proposal allows all rates above the minimum to remain unaltered indefinitely, while 
it requires major changes to be made in cases where the rates are currently low. This in  no way 
achieves the desired flexibility, and jeopardizes the goal of harmonization. 
The concern for consumer health which has led the Commission to propose considerably higher target 
rates than in 1987 seems too generic, and does not form part of a general health policy. 
The Commission proposals penalize cheaper products. This is unacceptable, not least because it 
would adversely affect Community tobacco-growing. 
It does not seem fair to particularly penalize the less well-off consumers who currently purchase the 
cheaper brands. 
In the light of the above considerations, the Committee's overall opinion of the Commission proposal 
cannot be a positive one. 
Done at Brussels, 5 July 1990 
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35 On 22 January 1990, the Council decided to consult the Economic and Social Committee, under Article 
198 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, on the 
Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on the approximation of  the rates of 
excise duty on mineral oils 
(COM(89) 526 final). 
The Section for Economic, Financial and Monetary Questions, which was responsible for preparing 
the Committee's work on the subject, adopted its Opinion on 21 June 1990. The Rapporteur was Mr 
DELLA CROCE. 
At its 278th Plenary Session (meeting of 5 July 1990) the Economic and Social Committee adopted 
the following Opinion by a large majority, with seven votes against and two abstentions. 
*  *  * 
1.  Commission Proposal 
The Commission's August 1987 proposal on mineral oils is also being made more flexible. 
By analogy with its proposals for other products on which excise duty is levied, the Commission is 
proposing to lay down only a minimum rate, to be applied from 1 January 1993 onwards, for petrol 
(leaded and unleaded), LPG, methane and kerosene used as engine fuel. 
On the other hand, bands of rates (with maxima and minima) are proposed for diesel, heating gas 
oil and heavy fuel oil. 
The reason given by the Commission for this different treatment is that it is necessary to distinguish 
between products which are essentially destined for final private consumption and those whose 
consumption is mainly commercial. 
The proposed minimum rates are as follows: 
Leaded petrol ECU 337 per 1000 I  it  res 
Unleaded petrol ECU 287 per 1000 litres 
LPG and methane ECU 84.5 per 1000 I  it  res 
Kerosene (propellant) ECU 337 per 1000 I  it  res 
The proposed bands of rates are as follows: 
Diesel ECU 195-205 per 1000 litres 
Heating gas oil ECU 47- 53 per 1000 litres 
Heavy fuel oil ECU  16- 18 per 1000 kg 
Kerosene used as fuel for other purposes ECU 47- 53 per 1000 litres 
The Commission is deferring its proposal on the benchmark values on which all rates will have to 
be aligned. 
2.  Comments 
The comments on the previous proposal made in Committee Opinion CES 745188 (Rapporteur: Mr 
BROICHER) still apply almost in full. Explicit reference will be made to these comments in the 
conclusions below. 
The harmonization of the excise duties on mineral oils must take account of not only the effects on 
national budgets, the need to abolish frontier checks and the impact on competition but also the great 
importance of assisting the establishment of a Community energy policy, and the protection of the 
en  vi ron ment. 
37 Accordingly, the fiscal policy to be adopted towards these products should be influenced by energy 
policy with its economic and ecological components. 
When laying down the excise duties, account should also be taken of other taxes and duties which 
in some cases have a direct or indirect effect on mineral oils. The uses to which the products are to 
be put should also be taken into consideration. For heating, distinctions should be made on the basis 
of the differences in mean temperatures. 
At the same time as harmonizing the excise duties on mineral oils, the Commission should undertake 
to submit detailed proposals without delay on the taxation of all energy sources and their uses, thereby 
prompting a general debate on this major issue. 
The Commission makes a few general remarks on the matter, but otherwise does not seem to take 
account of this priority demand. Its proposal is based on the calculation of arithmetic means. 
The Commission has thus missed a chance to intervene in an  important area and to gear fiscal 
harmonization to solving major energy consumption issues. 
The Commission's decision to lay down only minimum rates for some products does not seem wise. 
The proposed minimum rates are very high on average and very close to the single rates proposed 
in  1987. The minimum rate for diesel is even well above the single rate proposed previously. The 
Committee would also stress the case for not levying a duty on LPG. 
The bands of rates are certainly a wiser choice because both countries with low and countries with 
high rates will be forced to bring their rates closer together. 
In contrast with its submissions for alcohol and tobacco, the Commission has merely spelt out the 
principle of benchmark values, though it has committed itself to submitting a proposal by 31 December 
1990.1rrespective of whether the principle of benchmark values should be accepted, it must be pointed 
out that lack of knowledge about the proposal adds to the confusion. If the benchmark values are 
important, they should be made known immediately; if they are not, the whole proposal is weakened, 
to say the least. 
3.  Conclusions 
The main points of the Opinion on the previous proposal (CES 745/88, Rapporteur: Mr BROICHER) 
should be summarized at this point: 
there would seem to be a case for harmonizing excise duties on mineral oils at the lowest possible 
level, bearing in mind Member States' budgetary requirements; 
it would be advisable to abolish all excise duties on heavy fuel oils used purely for production 
purposes; 
it is questionable whether a specific tax on  heating oil is acceptable and whether all energy 
sources should not be treated equally; 
tax advantages already granted by Member States for some economic sectors or specific uses 
should be harmonized; 
the taxation of vehicle fuels cannot be dealt with in isolation. Road tax and other charges relating 
to the possession and use of vehicles must also be taken into consideration. 
The present Commission proposal's aim - but not its means- can be endorsed. 
The bands should be adopted for all products, with the compulsory maxima and minima being quite 
close to each other. 
38 Some derogations- albeit limited in time- could be provided for countries which run  into serious 
difficulties because of their budgets or differences in the systems. 
-The rates should be as tow as possible, while making due allowance for general and ecological 
requirements. The inflationary effect of price variations is a point to be borne in mind, too. 
Done at Brussels, 5 July 1990. 
The Chairman 
of the Economic and 
Social Committee 
Alberto MASPRONE 
APPENDIX 
The Secretary-General 
of the Economic and 
Social Committee 
Jacques MOREAU 
to the Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee 
The following amendment was rejected during the debate, but received at least 25°/o of the votes cast. 
Page 38, add a new paragraph 
Voting 
"2.9.  In order to prevent serious disturbances in trade in mineral oils, especially 
in frontier regions, private individuals should not be allowed- even  for their 
personal use - to  transport them across frontiers  in  trailers or commercial 
vehicles (which could easily be hired even with a driver). 
Authorization should be confined to the content of vehicles' tanks, with spot 
checks being carried out within frontiers to detect infringements." 
For: 20 
Against: 24 
Abstentions: 21 
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41 On 22 January 1990 the Council decided to consutt the Economic and Social Committee, under Article 
198 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, on the 
Proposal for  a Council Directive on the approximation of  the rates of  excise duty 
on alcoholic beverages and on the alcohol contained In other products 
(COM(89) 527 final). 
The Section for Economic, Financial and Monetary Questions, which was responsible for preparing 
the Committee's work on the subject, adopted its Opinion on 21 June 1990. (Rapporteur: Mr DELLA 
CROCE). 
At its 278th Plenary Session (meeting of 5 July 1990) the Economic and Social Committee adopted 
the following Opinion by a large majority, with 6 dissenting votes and 3 abstentions: 
*  *  * 
1.  The Commission proposal 
The Commission has made significant changes to its Draft Directive of  21 August 1987 (COM(87) 328 
final), which prescribed Community-wide rates of excise duty for all products. 
In the explanatory memorandum to its new proposal, the Commission admits that its  original approach 
to harmonization was too rigid and it therefore introduces flexibility. 
However, the Commission stresses that this more flexible approach must on no account jeopardize 
the fundamental principle involved, i.e. abolition of customs and tax frontiers so as to avoid creating 
excessive distortions of competition, diversions In the flow of trade and loss of revenue. 
The mainstay of the proposal is the fixing of minimum rates for all product categories as of 1 January 
1993.1t also sets higher "target" rates which Member States are expected to move towards after 1 
January 1993. Subsequent amendments to rates will only be authorized if they are conducive to the 
process of convergence on the target rates. 
At two-yearly intervals, the Council will review both minimum and target rates and make the necessary 
adjustments. 
The proposed rates are as follows: 
Minimum rate  Target rate  Previously 
proposed rate 
Beer  ECU 0. 7  48 per  1.496  1.32 
hi/degree Plato 
Still wine  9.35 hi  18.7  17 
Sparkling wine  16.5 hi  33  30 
Potable alcohol  1118.5hl  1398.1  1271 
Intermediate products  74.8 hi  93.5  85 
The Commission has  dropped its proposal to impose excise duties on alcohol contained in perfume 
and cosmetics (In 1987 it had proposed an excise duty of ECU 424 per hi). 
43 2.  General comments 
The Committee Opinion on the original Commission proposal (CES 746/88) remains valid, subject to 
the comments made in this Opinion. 
In particular it is worth remembering that the Committee found the Commission's proposal to set 
common rates too rigid, and advocated some degree of flexibility. 
More precisely, the Committee put the case for allowing a limited number of disparities to continue 
within a narrow band of rates. It also accepted the possibility of introducing a system of provisions 
and derogations which would allow rates to be standardized after 31  December 1992, provided the 
process of convergence was unquestionably under way. 
Now, however, the Commission is proposing so much flexibility that it could defeat the purpose of 
the whole exercise, which is to standardize excise duties so as to ensure that they have a neutral 
effect on the movement of goods. 
The introduction of a compulsory minimum rate is obviously a step in the right direction, but rates 
will continue to vary enormously given the heavy excise duties imposed on alcoholic beverages and 
alcohol products in some Member States. 
It should however be remembered that the aim of standardization is to: 
abolish tax frontiers 
avoid significant distortions in competition 
prevent fraud and tax evasion. 
There must be a real link between the proposals and these objectives. 
The differences between the minimum rates proposed by the Commission and the highest rate 
currently applied in the Member States are as follows: 
Beer  1 . 13.17  IRL 
Still wine  1 . 27.42  IRL 
Sparkling wine  1 . 31  IRL 
Potable alcohol  1 . 2.23  IRL 
Intermediate products  1 . 4.97  IRL 
Although the highest rates  are  levied  in  Ireland, there are  substantial differences between the 
proposed minimum levels and the rates applied in other Member States. 
These disparities would have a drastic effect on consumer prices, particularly for beer, wine and 
sparkling wine. 
Maximum rates will also have to be set if we are to achieve harmonization. Maximum and minimum 
rates will have to be as close as possible. 
Moreover, if minimum limits only were imposed, this could lead to higher average limits, thereby 
increasing revenue and making the ultimate abolition of excise duties an even remoter prospect. The 
Committee's comments on the Commission's general communication also apply here (CES 831190). 
Member States should recognize the need to reduce VAT for competition reasons, the sole obstacle 
here being the impact on budget revenue. But there are additional complications in the case of excise 
duties, such as differing traditions and the desire to curb consumption of various products. 
The target rates now recommended by the Commission are about 10°/o higher than the standard rates 
envisaged in its previous proposal. 
44 The Commtssion claims that this increase is justified on health grounds. It seems strange that the 
Commission did not take health considerations into account in its initial proposal, and in any case 
there is nothing to indicate that a difference of 10°/o will be enough to influence consumer trends. 
In the case of wine, for example, the Commission argues that the increase of  ECU 0.17 per litre will 
have a significant effect on alcohol abuse. 
However, the health issues should be dealt with quite differently and more carefully. 
Alcohol abuse is still a major problem in our society and adequate resources must be deployed to 
combat it. 
Alcohol is normally consumed in moderate quantities as part of the everyday diet, and thus gives 
no cause for concern. 
However, excessive consumption can result in alcohol abuse, with health and pathological effects. 
This is a problem which must be tackled in full knowledge of the facts, rather than in response to 
preconceived ideas. 
Rigorous statistical surveys on consumer trends, the development of disease, the social classes 
concerned and the environments in which alcohol abuse is particularly common, should therefore 
be carried out and acted on. 
At present it is impossible for the Committee to discuss these issues in any detail. 
It will therefore confine itself to a few, inevitably general, remarks. 
Consumption of wine is decreasing in countries where it is not taxed and increasing in countries where 
heavy excise duties are imposed. 
Consumption of high quality, expensive wines is increasing, whereas consumption of low and medium 
quality, i.e. cheaper, wines is declining. 
In the case of liqueurs, i.e. beverages with a high alcohol content, consumer trends again bear no 
relation to prices and taxes. In facf demand for the expensive products is increasing significantly, 
while the market for the cheaper ones is contracting, regardless of long-standing social customs. 
Generally speaking, consumption of non-alcoholic beverages is steadily increasing, even though they 
are disproportionately expensive considering the ingredients used. 
Thus it can be seen that prices have little impact on overall consumer trends, and none whatsoever 
on alcohol abuse. Other means, in addition to fiscal ones, must therefore play a leading role in action 
to combat alcoholism. 
3.  Specific comments on each product 
Beer. The minimum rate proposed by the Commission is significantly lower than the standard rate 
proposed in 1987, whilst the target rate, as with other products, has increased by over 10°/o. 
The Commission admittedly sets a low figure for the minimum rate, but it would seem reasonable 
to propose that excise duty on beer be phased out altogether as soon as possible. 
It also has to be recognized that there are certain parallels between beer and wine consumption, 
although competition and substitution between the two products are probably not a problem. 
Still wine. This should not be subject to excise duty as it is an item of everyday consumption. 
It is worth remembering that in five Member States wine is not taxed at all, and in France taxes are 
negligible (for reasons which are not revenue-related). Thus at the present time about 90°/o of all wine 
consumed in the Community is not liable to excise duty. 
45 The minimum rate of excise duty proposed for wine (ECU 9.35 per hi) would not even cover the adminis-
trative costs- evasion would be easy and widespread in countries which do not at present charge 
excise duty, making it harder to collect VAT dues as well. 
Sparkling wine. The Commission is proposing a much higher rate of duty for sparkling wine than for 
still wine because, it claims, sparkling wine is generally more expensive than still wine and represents 
a different segment of the market. There is no justification whatsoever for this. Sparkling wine almost 
always has a lower alcohol content and costs no more than good quality still wine. The only real 
difference is the presence of carbon dioxide. From an economic point of view, the value-added of 
sparkling wine is higher (labour and technology). 
Potable alcohol. The Commission advocates a very high rate of duty on potable alcohol. The obligatory 
minimum rate is to be 80°/o of the target rate (as against 50°/o for other products). This is unacceptable: 
liqueurs would be  beyond the means of consumers in many countries, and the traditionally less 
expensive products (such as  brandy) would be  priced right out of the market. The Commission 
proposals are lacking in logic in that they do nothing to address present problems in the market arising 
from differences in taxation. They require fundamental revision as far as potable alcohol is concerned. 
It would be ill-advised to charge excise duty on solid foods which contain alcohol (chocolates, sweets, 
mustard, etc.). They do not pose any health risks and making them dutiable would only have a harmful 
effect on competition. 
It should also be remembered that these products are currently duty-free in three Member States. 
Intermediate products. Once again, the Commission is proposing particularly heavy excise duties, 
with the minimum rate fixed at 80°/o of the target rate. Intermediate products deserve special attention, 
and all the comments made in the previous Committee Opinion apply here. The definition of inter-
mediate products also needs to be sufficiently precise and narrow. 
Beverages with a ·moderate alcohol content (certain aperitifs in particular) should also be given 
favourable rates. 
4.  Conclusions 
The proposals to merely fix minimum rates and recommend target rates, without any obligation to 
converge, are not commensurate with the aim of harmonization. 
All the points raised in the previous Committee Opinion (CES 746188) hold true for this Opinion. 
Rules on customs warehouses, methods of collecting taxes, transport, monitoring and prevention 
of fraud and tax evasion are extremely important. It is very difficult to make a detailed assessment 
of the proposal without knowing the Commission's views on these questions. 
The explanatory memorandum is inadequate, particularly as it fails to consider the implications for 
Member State budgets, consumption and inflation. 
Done at Brussels, 5 July 1990 
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47 On 22 November 1990 the Council decided to consult the Economic and Social Committee, under 
Article 198 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, on the 
Proposal for a Council Directive on  the general arrangements for products 
subject to excise duty and on the holding and movement of  such products 
(COM(90) 431  final) 
Proposal for a Council Directive on the harmonization of  the structures of  excise 
duties on alcoholic beverages and on the alcohol contained in other products 
(COM(90) 432 final) 
Proposal for a Council Directive amending Council Directives 721464/EEC and 
79132/EEC  on  taxes  other  than  turnover  taxes  which  are  levied  on  the 
consumption of  manufactured tobacco 
(COM(90) 433 final) 
Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on the harmonization of  the structures 
of  excise duties on mineral oils 
(COM(90) 434 final) 
The Section for Economic, Financial and Monetary Questions, which was responsible for preparing 
the Committee's work on the subject, adopted its Opinion on 15  January 1991. The Rapporteur was 
Mr PETERSEN. 
At its 283rd Plenary Session (meeting of 31  January 1991), the Economic and Social Committee 
adopted the following Opinion by a large majority, with 3 votes cast against and 2 abstentions: 
*  *  * 
Preliminary Comments 
At the end of 1989 the Commission presented draft Directives laying down minimum rates of duty 
for the three major groups of excise duty-on alcohol, tobacco products and mineral oils-to which 
the Member States would have to adapt their excise duty rates by the end of 1992
1
•  Rate bands 
should apply only to a few mineral oil products (diesel oil as well as light and heavy heating oil) because 
of the increased risk of distortions of competition. In addition the draft Directives contain target rates 
to apply throughout the Community in the long term. 
Further draft Directives for harmonization of excise duty structures were announced. In addition the 
Commission undertook to make proposals to regulate traffic in excisable goods and for the operation 
of interconnected tax warehouses used for trade in goods on which the payment of duty has been 
suspended. The draft Directives are those considered below. 
2.  General arrangements for products subject to excise duty 
(COM(90) 431  final) 
Introduction 
This draft Directive constitutes the basis for a general excise system which should lead to the removal 
of intra-Community frontiers and excise checks at frontiers from 1  January 1993 onwards. It forms 
part of the overall strategy for approximation of rates and harmonization of the structure of indirect 
taxes. 
COM(89) 525 final 
COM(89) 526 final 
COM(89) 527 final 
49 The proposal lays down the special applicability of the rules for the holding and circulation of excisable 
products. It applies to alcohol, tobacco products and mineral oil products. These goods are not subject 
to any taxes other than excise duties and value added tax. On goods other than those mentioned 
above, Member States may only levy excise 
duties (e.g. for environmental protection reasons) if they lead neither to taxation on entry into the 
national territory and  remission of tax on  leaving the national territory, nor to controls at  intra-
Community frontiers. 
Excise duty becomes chargeable in the Member State where the products in question are released 
for consumption. 
The movement of products subject to excise duty under duty-suspension arrangements takes place 
via interconnected tax warehouses. 
The  opening  of such  warehouses  is subject to certain  conditions and  to authorization by the 
competent tax authorities. 
The movement of products subject to excise duty under duty-suspension arrangements is carried 
out on the basis of an administrative document or of a commercial document  - whichever is preferred 
by the warehousekeeper. 
Provisions on controls and supervision arrangements are based on the principle of subsidiarity. The 
Member States can take all measures on their own territory to ensure that excise duties are paid where 
the final retail sale takes place. The use of tax markings or other means of control is permissible, 
provided that it is not discriminatory. 
In order to ensure the payment of duties to the State where actual consumption takes place, to make 
it possible for already taxed  goods to be  brought back into circulation under duty-suspension 
arrangements and to avoid double taxation, reimbursement procedures are provided for. 
General Comments on the Commission Proposal 
The Committee welcomes the Commission's proposals on the harmonization of the general system 
and of the structures of the specific excise duties. The Commission thereby recognizes that, in 
addition to approximation of duty rates in the Member States, an approximation of the structures 
(however minimal) is also necessary. The disparities existing in the Community, e.g.  on taxable items, 
levy methods, exemptions and payment conditions, lead to distortions of competition. There can be 
no doubt that these distortions of competition must also be removed. 
However, harmonization measures in this field cannot ensure that the distortions of competition 
caused by existing excise rate disparities are counteracted. The effects of structural disparities are 
less marked than those of the present considerable differences in  rates. The Committee would 
therefore stress that the Commission was correct to point out in 1987 (in COM(87)  320  final) that the 
aim of a single market can only be achieved if uniform excise rates are levied on the basis of a 
harmonized tax structure. 
It is to be welcomed that the Commission has confined itself to a few specific excise duties. 
The Commission has put controls in the hands of the Member States. The general principle should 
be  that  any  control  measures  and  supervision  arrangements  to  safeguard  the  "country  of 
consumption" principle and to avoid tax evasion should not bring about an unnecessary worsening 
in trade conditions. There is a need, above all, to ensure that small and medium-sized enterprises 
in particular do not have to meet additional transport and administrative costs which would constitute 
an unnecessary barrier to deliveries by these enterprises to other EC Member States. In addition, the 
measures should be adapted to the possible tax risk. 
In its Opinion of 5 July 1990
2
, the Committee mentioned that the removal of customs controls and 
the free movement of goods which are essential for completion of the Single Market will make the 
sale of goods easy and lucrative where the duties, and hence-ceteris paribus-the prices, are lower, 
OJ No. C 225/48 of 10 September 1990. 
50 thereby giving rise to substantial cross-frontier trade. Nonetheless, the Commission should be careful 
to ensure that this does not give rise to restrictive rules for the movement of goods, which would be 
incompatible with a European Single Market. The necessary controls must instead be effective but 
should be directed solely to preventing tax evasion and improper traffic in goods. It would in fact be 
disastrous if, after completion of the Single Market,  they  continued  to be  carried  out at  the 
Community's Internal frontiers as at present. 
If the suggested changes are made, the Committee regards the Commission proposal as sufficient 
to allow for the abolition of frontier controls on intra-Community trade in excisable goods by 1992, 
even if there should be no progress by then in the harmonization of excise duty rates. 
Specific Comments 
As in other EC Regulations or Directives, concepts of relevance to the uniform application of excise 
duty Directives (chargeable event, chargeability, person liable to excise, duties, release of products 
for consumption, etc.) should be legally defined for all Member States. This could, for example, be 
done in the General Provisions of Title  I. 
Article 2 
With regard  to the customs territory of the Community, the Committee would refer to Council 
Regulation (EEC) No.  2151184 of 23  July 1984. The Committee assumes that the Regulation on the 
Community Customs Code
3 will also come Into force on 1  January 1993. There should therefore be 
a reference in the final version of this Directive to Article  3 of the Customs Code, where the Community 
customs territory is defined. 
Article 3(2) 
For the sake of clarity, the words "(the entry taxes for imports from third countries)" should be inserted 
after the words "excise duty". 
Article 3(3) 
Does not apply to English version. 
Article 4(2) 
Chargeability is not here related to an objectively clear situation but to a rather vague occurrence, 
the time of which cannot be exactly determined. The definition used in the second sentence of this 
paragraph (the making available of products when they leave any arrangement under which payment 
of duties and taxes is suspended) needs to be clarified by the Member States, particularly with regard 
to the beginning of the prescribed period for payment. 
Article 5(1) 
For completeness as regards "acquisition", indent a) should read: 
"The sale or  acquisition of  products subject to excise duty in a Member State 
other than that in which the product has been released for trade shall give rise 
to chargeability to excise duty in the Member State where the sale or  acquisition 
takes place." 
Indent c) means that large quantities of excisable goods sent by mail-order from one Member State 
can be obtained by final consumers in another Member State without chargeability arising in the 
country of consumption. This would lead to a deviation from the "country of consumption" principle 
and could lead to considerable distortions of trade. The basis for it is the annual value of 1  million 
ECU  laid down for mail-order trade  in  Article  28  of Draft Directive COM(90)  182  - Transitional 
Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) No  ...  ./ ... to lay down the Customs Code of the Communities (COM(90)  71  final)  - OJ No. C  128 
of 23  May 1990, page  1. 
51 System for Value Added Tax. Only above this established annual value would mail-order give rise to 
chargeability in the country of destination, i.e. every case of mail-order trade in which this annual 
value is not exceeded would not form a basis for chargeability in the country of destination. Definitions 
of mail-order trade (for purposes of turnover tax and for special excise duty) should be clearly differen-
tiated here. 
Article 6(1) 
It  is  assumed that this provision covers  both the duty-paid and  the duty-free sectors (cf.  also 
COM(90)  430,  point  6.). This should be expressly stated in this paragraph. 
Article 8 a) 
In Article 8 a) authorization for warehouse traffic is made dependent on provision of a guarantee which 
should be supplemented to read as follows: 
"  ... a guarantee, if there are indications of  a risk to the excise duty which are 
justified in  the view of the relevant Member State" 
This restriction is sufficient for trouble-free operation of the single market, and less onerous for the 
economic actor concerned. 
Article 9 
The term used in the German version ("vorlaufiger Zollverkehr") is unknown. The divergences here 
between the English, French and German texts of the Draft Directive should be corrected. 
Article 1  0(2) 
The phrase "irregular removal" requires definition. 
Article 11 (2) 
For certain products subject to excise duty (mineral oil) ensuring identification by the procedure laid 
down here is impracticable and unnecessary. The description of goods which is already usual in the 
Community dispatch procedure would be enough. 
Article 11 (5) 
In this case the national arrangements must be made in such a way that abuse of this generous rule 
is excluded. Since this case does not concern an economic actor authorized to carry out warehouse 
traffic, this requirement would be met by the consignee presenting the goods to the relevant customs 
office on receipt of them. 
Article 12(1) 
To  prevent  abuse of the accompanying documents, the Committee recommends setting up  a 
numbered document register on which the withdrawal of documents must be recorded in each case. 
Article 13(1) 
The proposed arrangements clearly apply only to authorized warehousekeepers. If the consignee is 
not an authorized warehousekeeper, it may be necessary for the competent financial authorities to 
have a specific obligation to assist him. 
Article 14(1) 
It is not clear from the text of the provision who is liable to payment of excise in these cases. Suitable 
additional wording is desirable. 
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The  Commission has refrained  from  regulating payment deadlines. This  - as the Commission 
concedes in the first paragraph on page  13 of  the Commentary on the Articles  - can lead in financial 
terms to distortions of competition. 
Article 15(2) 
The proposed wording is misleading, since it fails to  distinguish between national identification marks 
and tax identification markings. Identification marks proper, with no fiscal significance, have no place 
in this draft Directive; identification marks with a dual (i.e. also fiscal) function, however, are already 
covered by the term "tax identification markings". 
Article 15(5) 
Before "Article 12(1)", insert "11(1) in conjunction with". 
Article 16(1) 
Instead of the permissive wording "may ..... be the subject of  ... ", this paragraph should, like paragraph 
(2), provide for obligatory reimbursement. It should be reworded as follows: 
"  ... duty-suspension arrangements, and in such cases excise duties shall be 
reimbursed in the Member State of  release  ... 
Moreover, Article 16(1) appears to mean that an already taxed item can be transferred back into 
warehouse traffic, and can then be further traded as if it were tax-free. However, the phrase "by 
derogation from Article 11(1)" seems to contradict this interpretation. 
Article 16(2) 
Here, as in Article 11(5), an obligation at national level to present the goods must be justified. 
Article 17 
If the excise duty is imposed by means of a tax marking, reimbursement must be made conditional 
on the destruction or invalidation of the tax marking under official supervision. 
3.  Harmonization of the structures of excise duties on alcoholic beverages and on 
the alcohol contained in other products 
(COM(90) 432 final)
4 
Introduction 
This Commission proposal for a Directive supersedes earlier proposals for a larger degree of harmoni-
zation-some of which were tabled in the seventies. These were the draft Directives on harmonization 
of excise duties on: 
Alcohol  COM(72) 225/02 
Wine  COM(72) 225/03 
Beer  COM(72) 225/04 
Fortified wine and similar products  COM(85) 151. 
This single proposals, covering all alcoholic beverages defines (a) the various categories of chargeable 
alcoholic beverages-beer, still and sparkling wine, intermediate products and spirits-and the divisions 
within these categories, (b) the exemptions and (c) the special conditions to apply to small businesses. 
Tht~ products covered by this draft Directive are listed in Article 15. They are those denoted by CN Codes 2204-2206, with an alcohol 
content above 22% by volume, and all those denoted by CN Codes 2207 and 2208. 
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rate) for small breweries whose annual production does not exceed 60,000 hectolitres, though this 
reduced rate may not be less than the Commission's minimum rate. Similarly, wines with a particu-
larly low alcoholic strength may qualify for a reduced rate. 
An optional exemption from excise duty is proposed for home-made beer or wine, and a mandatory 
exemption is proposed for alcoholic beverages or products with an alcoholic strength not exceeding 
1.2°/o vol, completely denatured alcohol and denatured alcohol contained in perfumes, toiletries, 
cosmetics and medicines for external use. 
The quantity of alcohol or alcoholic beverage contained in manufactured products is to be subject 
to the duty applicable to the category to which the alcohol or alcoholic beverage belongs. 
Comments 
Article 3(1) 
The Commission proposes to charge a rate per hectolitre/degree Plato on beer. This approach is not 
completely without its problems since it is technically difficult to lay down dividing lines. However, 
the fact that fractions of a degree Plato can be ignored is to be welcomed. 
Article 3(2) 
The possibility of being able to divide beers into categories according to the Plato measurement will 
meet with difficulties in those Member States where the current rates on beer are below the minimum 
proposed by the Commission. Since under the proposal Member States are not to go below the 
minimum rate in any category, they would be forced to increase their upper rates. A grading of rates 
by category does not make any sense unless it allows Member States to drop below the minimum 
rate in the lower categories. 
Article 4(1) 
The same reservations apply to the proposal that the reduction granted to small breweries may not 
go below the minimum rate. If Member States wanted to apply this reduction, they would have to 
increase still further the rate for non-privileged breweries. 
Article 4(3) 
The Committee proposes that this paragraph be made into a separate Article, drafted on the lines 
of Article 9 (wine). 
Furthermore, the Committee holds to the view which it voiced in earlier Opinions (CES 746/88 of 7 
July 1988, point 2.10., CES 832/90 of 5 July 1990, point 3.1. and 3.2.) that beer- just like wine- is part 
of the normal diet in many countries of the Community, and hence that both these drinks should be 
exempt from excise duty. If nevertheless they are to be subject to excise duty, the rates should be 
kept as low as possible. A scheme should be drawn up which treats all breweries favourably regardless 
of their size, e.g. a fully graded scheme for all based on production volumes. 
The call for duty-free beer also applies to wine. An overwhelming proportion of wine consumed in 
the Community is subject to little or no excise duty. 
Article 11 
A separate tax regime should apply to natural sweet wine with a registered designation of origin_in 
view of its particular nature, as defined in Article 13(2) of Regulation 4252/88. 
This principle should be underlined in Article 12 and the reference made therein to the customs nomen-
clature should be deleted. 
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It should be noted that in  the earlier Opinion (CES 832/90 of 5 July 1990, paragraph 3.4.) the Committee 
expressed the view that the Commission had advocated an unacceptably high rate of duty on potable 
alcohol putting liqueurs and other high quality spirit products beyond the means of consumers in 
rTlany countries. The Committee went on to say that the Commission's proposals on potable alcohol 
are lacking in logic, in that they do nothing to address the present differences in taxation levels 
between various alcoholic beverages, and therefore require fundamental revision as far as potable 
alcohol is concerned. The Committee wishes to re-emphasize this point. 
Article 17(1)(c) 
The exemptions for alcohol used in the manufacturing sector for the production of perfumes, toiletries, 
cosmetics or medicines tor external use are welcomed. 
Article 17(1 )(d) 
As. the Committee has already stated in its Opinion CES  832/90 of 5 July 1990 (point 3.4.1.), it does 
not seem expedient to charge excise duties on solid foods which contain alcohol. Such products pose 
no health risks and making them subject to duty would only have unfavourable effects on competition. 
The Committee therefore proposes that the sub-paragraph should read: 
"when used for the production of  foodstuffs and confectioneries which are not 
alcoholic drinks; 
On social grounds, the Committee favours the addition of a point (f) in Article  17(1) to exempt wine 
and beer which producers give to their employees as a fringe benefit. 
Article 17(2) 
The Committee supports the "mutual-recognitiondenaturants" principle. However, there is a danger 
that market transparency will be blurred by the information procedure proposed by the Commission. 
The Committee therefore supports the Commission in its efforts to harmonize denaturants and 
denaturing methods. 
Unlike the previous structural proposals from 1972, the present draft does not lay down any rules for 
small and fixed-quality distillers. At the moment these distillers enjoy special rights in three countries 
of the Community. The European Court of Justice has already examined these special rights in one 
case and found them to be compatible with Article 95 of the EEC Treaty. If maintained, these special 
rights would be unlikely to distort competition. Small and fixed-quantity distilleries- just like small 
breweries and small wine-growers- should therefore be given special treatment, thereby enabling 
special rights under national law to be retained for the present. 
The question of the relative burden of excise duties on different categories of beverages should be 
addressed by the Commission's proposals. In particular, it is necessary to establish a proper 
relationship between the duties on different categories of beverage and it is therefore suggested that 
a new article be included after Article 18 which provides that, after agreement has been reached on 
fiscal
1 approximation, the excise duties levied by Member States shall not be changed so as to increase 
the di'fference between the duties on the different beverages-expressed in ECU per hectolitre of pure 
alcohol. 
4.  Amendment of Directives 72/464/EEC and 79/32 EEC on taxes, other than turnover 
taxes, levied on tobacco goods 
(COM(90) 433 final) 
Introduction 
The excise duty on tobacco is the only specific excise duty to have had its structure already partially 
harmonized. The purpose of the present proposal is to make certain amendments to Directives 
55 72/464/EEC and 79/32/EEC which the Commission considers necessary for the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market. These changes concern in particular: 
the shortening of the programme for harmonizing- in the case of cigarettes- the ratio between 
the total tax burden and the specific excise duty, as already provided for in COM(87) 325 and 
COM(89) 525; 
the updating of the manufacturing and importing concepts; 
the calculating of VAT on the basis of the maximum retail selling price. 
The main point about the excise duty on tobacco-as indeed about all the other excise duties-is that 
the harmonization of structure and rates must form one entity. Even after the Commission proposals 
of December 1989 there will still be considerable differences in rates after 1 January 1993. As the 
Committee has already indicated in point 2.4. of its Opinion CES 834/90 of 5 July 1990, the removal 
of internal frontiers will be made more difficult by this fact. 
At the moment the ratio between the specific and proportional components of the excise duty on 
tobacco differs between the North and South of the Community, and the prime aim of harmonization 
should be to eliminate the difference. 
Specific comments 
Article 1(2), first sentence 
Article 1(2) of the proposal makes provision for the amendment of Article 5(1) of Directive 72/464/EEC. 
The Commission uses the term "maximum retail selling price" here. However, the Committee thinks 
that manufacturers and  importers must determine the "retail selling price" and  not merely the 
"maximum retail selling price", thereby fixing not only a ceiling price but also a floor price. The basis 
of assessment for the excise duty on tobacco is not only the quantity but also the value, and this 
assessment is performed by the manufacturer or importer as the person liable for the duty. The only 
way to ensure that the duty to be paid is based on the price paid by the consumer is to fix both a 
maximum and a minimum price. It  will not be enough to fix only a maximum price, for downward 
variations in price are bound to result in the duty paid being more than it would if based on the price 
paid by the consumer at the retail trade stage. 
Article 1  (2), second sentence 
The term "manufacturer" is defined in the second sentence. What is meant by "importer" should also 
be spelt out in a new third sentence. Reference could be made here to Article  1(1) of the proposal, 
which amends Article 4(1) of Directive 72/464/EEC and restricts the term to the importing of cigarettes 
from non-member countries. 
Article 1  (4) 
·Article 1(4) of the proposal provides for the inclusion of a new Article 6a) in Directive 72/464/EEC. This 
will deal with optional exemptions from excise duty insofar as they have not been regulated elsewhere. 
The Committee thinks that the following exemptions should be added after indents (a) to (c): 
cigarettes used as official test samples; 
cigarettes used for testing purposes in a registered manufacturing establishment; 
cigarettes given free of charge by manufacturers to employees as a fringe benefit. 
In addition, the exemptions listed in Article 6a) should be amplified as follows: 
56 
manufactured tobacco which is denatured under administrative supervision should be included 
in b); 
c) must be broadened to include all scientific tests. There is no risk of competition being distorted even if only a few Member States take advantage of 
the exemptions. Large-scale shortfalls in revenue are not likely either. 
By way of further comment, the Committee suggests that, given the high minimum rate for smoking 
tobacco in proposal COM(89) 525, Article 3 of Directive 72/464/EEC and Article 1 of Directive 79/32/EEC 
be amended so as to divide smoking tobacco into: 
"fine-cut smoking tobacco suitable for hand rolling", and 
"other smoking tobacco". 
5..  Harmonization of the structures of excise duties on mineral oils 
(COM(90) 434 final) 
Introduction 
The proposed Directive supersedes an earlier proposal from the year 1973 (COM(73) 1234).1t defines 
excisable products on the basis of the Combined Nomenclature (CN) Codes; deals with aspects of 
the production process, chargeable event and tax payment which are peculiar to mineral oils; and 
covers tax exemptions as well as reduced tax rates for specific types of final consumption. 
Specific comments 
Article 2(1) 
The Commission lists excisable mineral oil products on the basis of Combined Nomenclature (CN) 
Codes. The list is thus longer than the one established under existing legal provisions, with the excise 
tax net now encompassing products which, with one or two exceptions, are not in fact used as heating 
or motor fuel either for economic or technical reasons. It might, however, have been wiser to limit 
excisable products to the most common refinery products. Substitution products should be covered 
by a catch-all provision insofar as they are used as heating or motor fuels. 
For practical purposes it is also unhelpful if excisable products are described in terms of "suitability" 
and "usability" (criteria which are hard to establish) rather than on the basis of objective physical 
criteria. 
Article 3 
The, Commission has laid down a standard temperature of 15 degrees Celsius for the purpose of 
defining the tax base. In Member States with a tower reference temperature this will lead to hidden 
tax increases. 
The ,kilo" unit of weight for heavy fuel oils or  products used as such should be interpreted as "mass" 
or as "weight in air" ("Gewicht in Luft''). 
As part of the harmonization process, efforts should also be made to standardize. methods for 
calculating the weight of different mineral oils. Different methods (calculation by mass and by "weight 
in air") create a whole host of problems when it comes to trade involving mineral oils: the non-
comparability of mass and "weight in air" hinders comparison of prices and taxable quantities 
(problem of assessing wastage in transit). 
Article 4(2) 
In the case of mineral oils consumed within an establishment where mineral oils are produced, the 
basic principle is tax exemption except where such consumption is for purposes not related to the 
production of mineral oils or for the propulsion of motor vehicles. To define this chargeable event 
more precisely, it would perhaps be more appropriate to replace the negative definition in the proposal 
by a positive one. 
57 Article 5(2) 
The Commission's definition allows Member States not to regard as mineral-oiiNproducing estab-
lishments those establishments in which the only products manufactured are lubricants not subject 
to the harmonized excise duty. This provision could be dropped since its content is self-evident merely 
from the definition of excisable products. 
Article 6 
The draft text contains no definition of the term "operations". 
Article 8(1 )c) 
The Commission excludes natural gas from the list of chargeable products covered by the Draft 
Directive, except where it is used as motor fuel. It is not clear whether the intention here is to totally 
exempt natural gas from taxation as a raw material and energy source in the Community, or whether 
the Commission merely wishes to avoid uniform Community regulations. In the latter case national 
taxes would continue to be permissible provided that they do not make intra-Community border 
controls and compensation necessary. Since the natural gas supply system is a closed circuit, 
controls away from borders are quite conceivable. 
Natural gas is currently subject to taxation in some but not in other Member States. It is to be feared 
that if this inconsistency is allowed to continue, it will lead to noticeable distortions of competition 
both within the EC and visvis non-Member States. Harmonization, as the Committee has emphasized 
on several occasions (cf. CES 833/90 of 5 July 1990, point 3.1.), should avoid distortion of competition 
between competing energy sources. 
In its Opinions of 5 July 1990 (CES 833/90) and 7 July 1988 (CES 745/88) the Committee has already 
called for the abolition of excise duties on heavy fuel oil, stating that it would be advisable to abolish 
all excise duties on heavy oil fuels used purely for production purposes, and that it is debatable 
whether an excise duty on light heating oil alone is acceptable, since all energy sources must be 
treated equally. 
In point 2.1.2. of document CES 745/88 the Committee quotes the Commission's statement (made 
in COM(73) 1234 final) to the effect that excise duties on mineral oils are a tax on (final) consumption 
and not a tax on production, the latter being liable to increase industrial production costs. 
One Member State is currently operating a tax refund system, modelled on the VAT system, for the 
industrial use of energy sources. This example should be taken up throughout the Community. 
Article 9 
In the Committee's view there is a danger that national controls are not in themselves sufficient to 
prevent the misuse of mineral oils used as heating or motor fuel at reduced rates. The Commission 
should therefore submit draft Community standards for the colouring and marking of such mineral 
oils, before tax borders are abolished. 
Done at Brussels, 31  January 1991. 
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59 On 25 February 1989 the Council decided to consult the Economic and Social Committee, under Article 
198 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, on the 
Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common System of Withholding Tax on 
Interest Income 
Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 771799/EEC concerning 
Mutual Assistance by the Competent Authorities of the Member States in the 
Field of  Direct Taxation and Value Added Tax 
(COM(89) 60 final/3). 
The Section for Economic, Financial and Monetary Questions, which was responsible for preparing 
the Committee's work on the matter, adopted its Opinion on 4 July 1989. The Rapporteur was Mr 
BROICH  EA. 
At its 268th Plenary Session (meeting of 12 July 1989) the Economic and Social Committee adopted 
the following Opinion by 85 votes to 7, with 29 abstentions. 
*  *  * 
The Commission's proposal to introduce a Community-wide withholding tax on interest meets with 
the approval of the Committee, subject to the following comments. The proposal to extend mutual 
assistance is welcomed. 
1.  Preliminary remarks 
Under the Directive on the full liberalization of capital movements, adopted by the Council on 24 June 
1988(
1>, the last barriers to capital flows will be removed in eight of the Member States by mid-1990. 
Transitional provisions will be applicable in the other four Member States until1992 and, if deemed 
to be necessary, may be extended by three years in two of the four Member States. 
Liberalization of the capital market is a prerequisite for achievement of the single market. Where 
Member States have different systems for taxing interest income, there is a possibility that-unless 
other considerations are involved-capital investment decisions will be guided by tax and not economic 
factors. 
The Council Directive of 24 June 1988 accordingly stipulates that the Commission shall submit 
proposals aimed at eliminating or reducing risks of distortion, tax  evasion and tax avoidance linked 
to the diversity of national systems for the taxation of savings and for controlling the application of 
these systems. The Commission fulfils this obligation in presenting the two Directives now under 
discussion. 
2.  General comments on the withholding tax 
The Committee is united in its belief that the withholding tax is an appropriate form of taxation from 
various points of view, including the principle of equity. Interest payments are taxed immediately, 
thereby providing a secure source of income in the Member States. By being levied at source, the 
withholding tax on interest income bears some resemblance to the wage tax levied on earned income 
at source. Earned income is taxed at source in most Member States. 
(1)  OJ  No. L 178 of 8 July 1988, page 5 
61 Most Member States already have a withholding tax on interest. The impending liberalization of the 
capital market therefore necessitates Community regulations to forestall (point 1.2.) the misallocation 
of capital resources resulting from investments being attracted to areas with the most favourable 
tax systems. 
One of the main reservations of the Committee about the draft Directive is that even Community 
regulations will not prevent capital from being invested in tax-free bonds. The Commission should 
consider how far this investment loophole can be  rendered  compatible with a Community-wide 
withholding tax system. Eurobonds should, however, be exempted from the withholding tax for the 
reasons put forward by the Commission. 
The Committee has similar reservations about the fact that it will still be possible to invest capital 
in non-member countries where there is no withholding tax. In other words, will the EC and the most 
important non-member countries not have to reach joint agreement on the taxation of interest before 
the withholding tax can actually become an instrument of just and equitable taxation? We need to 
look at the question of whether or not implementation of the EC Directive should be dependent on 
a commitment by the Community's most important trading partners to operate parallel schemes 
themselves. Otherwise, as the most recent examples show, a major outflow of capital from the 
Community to non-member countries can be expected. 
The Commission is well aware of this problem but merely refers to the need for subsequent negoti-
ations. 
3.  Specific comments on the withholding tax 
Article 4 
The higher the rate of the withholding tax, the greater the attractiveness of tax avoidance. Setting 
a rate of around 10°/o would therefore be desirable. The Committee also feels that a lower rate will 
considerably facilitate the passage of the Directive through the Council, where a unanimous vote 
is required. 
Article 4(3) 
Consideration should be given here to whether, and to what extent, bilateral agreements should take 
precedence over the Directive. 
Article 5 
To keep the administrative expenditure of the authorities and credit institutions within bounds, the 
Commission would have to consider whether interest accruing from negligible sources, e.g. savings 
accounts, might not be exempted from the withholding tax. Consideration should also be given to 
whether the rules on exemptions should or should not be binding on all Member States. 
Done at Brussels, 12 July 1989. 
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APPENDIX 
Taxation of Interest on Capital 
Position as of 1 January 1989 
RESIDENTS  NON-RES  I  DENTS  RESIDENTS 
Withholding tax on Interest  Withholding tax on interest  Withholding tax on interest 
on bonds (subject to the  on bonds (subject to the  on bank and savings 
provisions of double  provisions of double  accounts (subject to the 
taxation conventions)  taxation conventions)  provisions of double 
taxation conventions) 
Automatic communication  Automatic communication 
from banks to adminis- from banks to adminis· 
tration  tration 
25%  25%  20% 
25%  25% 
Automatic communication 
from banks to adminis-
tration 
Automatic communication  Automatic communication 
from banks to tax adminis·  0%  from banks to tax adminis· 
tration or different rates  tration or different rates 
discharging of debt  discharging of debt 
35% (exceptions)  35% (exceptions)  35% 
20% (exceptions)  20% (exceptions)  20% 
25% (exceptions)  25% (exceptions)  25% residents 
Companies:  Companies:  Companies: 
- with permanent  - with permanent  - with permanent 
establlsment: 25%  establisment: 25%  establisment: 25% 
- without permanent  - without permanent  - without permanent 
establishment: 49%  establishment: 49%  establishment: 49% 
Persons:  Persons:  Persons: 
at progressive rates of  at progressive rates of 
income tax;  Income tax; 
0% public loans and bonds  0% public loans and bonds 
of corporations engaged in  of corporations engaged in 
industrial activities  Industrial activities 
10%  10%  10% 
12.5% ·discharging of debt  12.5% ·discharging of debt  30% 
(no choice for the  (no choice for the 
beneficiary)  beneficiary) 
NON-RESIDENTS 
Withholding tax on Interest 
on bank and savings 
accounts.(subject to the 
provisions of double 
taxation conventions) 
20% 
0% 
20% 
0% 
Companies: 
- with permanent 
establisment: 25% 
- without permanent 
establishment: 49% 
Persons: 
10% 
30% 
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